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Abstract 
Following the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement, much has been written on the potential 
costs and benefits of stronger Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) protection in terms of its 
impact on innovation and technology transfer, as well as economic growth and welfare. This 
paper documents the development of IPR regimes within countries and internationally, 
before surveying the theoretical and empirical literature linking the protection of IPRs to 
economic growth, innovation and technology diffusion.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The argument underlying public policy intervention to protect Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs) is that without such protection competitive market systems fail to provide private 
agents with sufficient incentives to undertake the costly and risky investments that generate 
the new ideas and technologies (knowledge) now widely recognised as the main source of 
sustained economic growth. This is because knowledge has “public good” attributes. 
Knowledge is typically non-excludable; in that it is not possible to prevent others from applying 
new knowledge even without the authorisation of its creator. If a new technology is valuable, 
it is therefore likely to be copied or imitated, reducing the potential profits of the original 
inventor and potentially removing the incentive to engage in innovative activities. Where 
“imitation” has lower costs than “innovation”, imitators have the advantage over innovators 
unless the latter can restrict access to their innovation. This characteristic provides the 
argument for strong IPR protection. IPRs create ownership of intellectual property by giving 
innovators the legally enforceable power to prevent others from using an intellectual creation 
or to set the terms on which it can be used. That is, IPRs encourage innovation by granting 
successful inventors temporary monopoly power over their innovations. The consequent 
monopoly profits provide the return on successful investment in R&D.  
 
The other public good aspect of knowledge compounds the costs of granting this monopoly 
power. Knowledge tends to be non-rival, in that the marginal cost for an additional firm or 
individual to use the knowledge is often negligible. Once an innovation has been created, its 
non-rival character suggests that benefits will be maximised if its use is free to all at marginal 
cost. Although a policy of free access will yield benefits in the short run, it will severely 
damage the incentive for further innovations. IPRs allow successful innovators to appropriate 
some of the consumer surplus their innovation generates, both as a reward for their 
innovative efforts and to provide an incentive to future investors. Because research is a risky 
activity, returns on successful R&D (which produces intellectual property) must be large 
enough to compensate for the high proportion of R&D that is unsuccessful, generating in this 
way a normal return on R&D as a whole.1 
 
Choice of IPR policy then reflects a balancing of these considerations. The awarding of a 
temporary monopoly, although second-best, is intended to restore the incentive to innovate, 
which in turn should encourage long-run growth and improved product quality. It is not an all 
or nothing decision, however. Even in the absence of IPR protection there may exist natural 
incentives to innovate depending upon market lead times, marketing strategies and the 
difficulties in copying and imitating (Maskus, 2000a), and these features are likely to be more 
                                                          
1 Evidence suggests that IPR protection stimulates innovation and that the social rate of return to innovation 
appears to be considerably higher than the rate of return to the innovator (Mansfield et al., 1977). 
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important than IPR protection under certain circumstances. Excessive IPR protection is likely 
to lead to an inadequate dissemination of new knowledge, which in itself could slow growth to 
the extent that access to existing technology is necessary to induce further innovation2. Other 
costs to society of strong IPR protection include rent seeking behaviour, the wasteful 
duplication of investment in R&D (i.e. patent races) and the costs of judicial actions to 
enforce property rights (Maskus, 2000a). Giving innovators too much protection may also 
limit the spread of new ideas and lead to permanent monopoly. Entry by rivals may be 
impeded, and successful innovators may have reduced incentives for developing and 
exploiting subsequent innovations3. 
 
If IPRs were set and enforced by a global authority then, in principle, this authority would be 
in a position to determine the appropriate strength of IPR protection for the world as a whole. 
But IPRs are conferred by national governments and valid only within the relevant 
jurisdiction. Consequently, national IPR systems have largely focussed on what was perceived 
to be in the best interests of the country concerned, and different countries perceived the 
trade-off between profits and innovation differently. Thus (developed) countries, with many 
potential innovators, have tended to opt for relatively strong IPR systems, with the aim of 
encouraging inventive and creative activities, which are seen as an important source of long-
run economic growth.4 With R&D spending concentrated in a handful of the world’s richest 
countries however, genuinely innovative activities are limited in most developed and 
developing countries, and the majority have taken a different approach, providing only weak 
IPR protection, if any, as a way of allowing the rapid diffusion of knowledge. For many of 
these countries imitation can be a significant source of technological development, and 
providing stronger IPR protection is seen as shifting profits from domestic imitative firms to 
foreign firms and reducing output in the domestic economy, rather than encouraging domestic 
innovative activity (Deardoff, 1992). The counter argument is that stronger IPR protection 
can help reward creativity and risk-taking even in developing economies, with those countries 
that retain weak IPR protection remaining dependent on dynamically inefficient firms that rely 
on counterfeiting and imitation (Maskus, 2000a). 
 
Until 1995, the international Intellectual Property Regime (IPR) consisted of various voluntary 
conventions under the stewardship of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). 
With the globalisation of markets and the resulting increases in trade and investment flows 
                                                          
2 Hence the argument, discussed below, that in many countries weak IPR protection actually stimulated R&D 
activity by encouraging knowledge spillovers from transnational companies (TNCs) and other domestic firms 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). 
3 Gilbert and Newey (1982) show that under certain conditions a monopolist may accumulate patents and allow 
them to “sleep”, thus deterring entry into an industry. 
4 Indeed there has been a general strengthening and broadening of IPRs over time in developed countries 
(Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998). 
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across borders, particularly flows of technology and technology-intensive products5 
differences in national IPR standards have taken on additional significance. Firms have looked 
increasingly to foreign markets to sell their goods and to foreign destinations as platforms for 
production, making it easier for intellectual property to be accessed and copied in countries 
that provide weak IPR protection. This is one of the major reasons why firms investing 
heavily in R&D put pressure on national governments to strengthen the international IPR 
regime. The increasing importance of technology for international competition, the emergence 
of new technologies (e.g. computer programs or biotechnology) associated with high 
externalities and limited appropriability and the perception of developed countries that their 
technological lead has been diminished by countries that have caught up by imitation also 
contributed to this pressure (Correa, 2000: pp. 3-4). The outcome was the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), a product of the Uruguay 
Round (1986-94) of trade negotiations. TRIPS is the first comprehensive and global set of 
rules covering IPR protection6. It sets minimum standards of protection to be provided by 
each World Trade Organization (WTO) member in each of the main areas of intellectual 
property covered, as well as requiring countries to develop mechanisms to enforce these 
rights. While for most developed countries TRIPS compliance only requires minor 
adjustments of their national IPR systems, for developing countries TRIPS often implies a 
major rise in their level of IPR protection. The TRIPS Agreement does allow countries to 
pursue different policies with respect to IPR protection, but does specify minimum standards 
that should be attained by a designated time. Box 1 highlights some of the major requirements 
of TRIPS. The areas covered are copyrights and related rights, trademarks, geographical 
indications, industrial designs, patents, the layout designs of integrated circuits and 
undisclosed information including trade secrets and test data. Table 1 provides more 
information on these forms of intellectual property and how they are covered by international 
agreements.  
 
From the preceding discussion it might be difficult to see why developing countries agreed to 
TRIPS. One factor was pressure from advanced countries (the US and the EU in particular). 
Developing country governments also thought that agreeing to TRIPS would encourage 
negotiations allowing developing countries wider access to agricultural and textile markets in 
developed countries. In addition business interests within many developing countries 
encouraged their governments to adopt stronger IPR protection in order to protect their own 
innovative activities tailored to the domestic market (Sherwood, 1997; Maskus, 1998a). 
                                                          
5 The share of knowledge-intensive or high-tech products in total world goods trade doubled between 1980 and 
1994 (Fink and Primo Braga, 2005). 
6 There have been international agreements on IPRs since the nineteenth century. Until recently the main 
instruments of international law regarding the substantive protection of IPRs were the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property (1883) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works (1886). The TRIPS Agreement has been analysed extensively by Primo Braga (1996), UNCTAD (1996) 
and Maskus (1997). 
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Stronger IPR protection can also encourage increased imports, inward Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and technology licensing, all of which can lead to increased technology 
transfer7. Indeed Article 7 of the Agreement states that “[T]he protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation 
and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers 
and users of technological knowledge in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, 
and to a balance of rights and obligations”. The various areas of IPR protection covered by 
TRIPS are likely themselves to have differing impacts on innovation and technology diffusion, 
and some of these differences are discussed in Box 2. 
 
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows: Section 2 describes the historical 
development of patent regimes both within countries and globally. Section 3 discusses the 
economic rationale for patent protection, while Section 4 surveys the literature linking IPR 
protection to innovation. Section 5 surveys the literature considering the relationship between 
IPRs and the channels of technology diffusion, namely international trade, FDI, licensing and 
foreign patenting. In Section 6 we discuss the relationship between IPRs and economic 
growth, firstly describing theoretical contributions, and secondly by discussing the available 
empirical literature. Section 7 discusses some issues of importance for developing countries 
and Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. A Brief History of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
2.1. Development of Intellectual Property Rights Regimes across Countries 
 
The name patent derives from the Latin words “litterea patentes” which literally translated 
means open letters. These “letters” entitled the holder to certain rights, titles, or privileges. 
During the 14th and 15th century the main purpose of these privileges was mostly to foster 
technology transfer from foreign countries by giving the importer the right to exclusive 
exploitation of the technology for a certain period of time.  This, of course, is quite 
contradictory to today's purpose of patent protection (David, 1993). The first formal patent 
law8 was enacted by the Venetian Senate in 1474: 
 
“We have among us men of great genius, apt to invent and discover 
ingenious devices (...). Now, if provision were made for the works and 
devices discovered by such persons, so that other who may see them could 
not build them and take the inventor’s honour away, more men would then 
                                                          
7 It is now widely accepted, for example, that the assimilation of foreign technology was a critical component of 
the Asian Miracle (see for example Nelson and Pack, 1999).  
8 There is evidence that the Venetian Senate had been granting similar rights long before their formal recording 
in 1474 (Kaufer, 1989). 
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apply their genius, would discover, and would build devices of great utility to 
our commonwealth.” (cited in Kaufer, 1989) 
 
The Republic of Venice though was not the only one to grant these kinds of privileges. There 
is evidence that this practice existed informally in Electoral Saxony, the Austrian Archduchy, 
England under Edward III and the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands, while France 
started to use this practice on a regular basis during the middle of the 16th century as a part of 
its mercantilist policy (Kaufer, 1989). The purpose of these practices was the same in all 
countries: the introduction of devices or processes unknown in their respective countries. 
 
During this time most technological knowledge was embodied in skilled artisans rather than 
machinery. Therefore patent privileges were in the first place used to encourage the 
immigration of foreign skilled artisans. In order to protect the immigrated artisan from 
competition from their apprentices and students the sovereign normally granted them 
monopoly rights for two or three service-terms of an apprentice9. From the sovereign's point 
of view granting monopoly rights was especially convenient since they did not burden the 
budget and moved the market risk to the immigrated artisan (David, 1993). 
 
Despite some differences among European countries the fact that patent privileges were 
typically granted by the sovereign without the possibility of interference led to substantial 
abuses of the monopoly privileges. In early 17th century England for example, the misuse of 
monopoly privileges hindered the development of whole sectors (for example, the paper 
industry) and raised prices considerably since the Crown handed out monopolies for products 
such as salt, soap, vinegar and coal. In 1624 the British Parliament curbed this practice by 
forcing the Crown to implement the “Statute of Monopolies”. This Statute was not an explicit 
patent law but rather regulated the granting of monopolies. It nullified all working monopolies 
and declared them illegal, with one exception; the grant of patent privileges to the “true and 
first inventor and inventors” of new manufactures.  The “true and first inventor and 
inventors” referred only to those inventors from England however (Kaufer, 1989). Thus, 
patents on new manufactures developed and protected abroad could be patented by the 
person transferring it to England. This indicates that, just like the Venetian Senate, the British 
Parliament considered technology transfer and industrial development an integral feature of 
patent protection.  
 
While the British Parliament was able to cut back the excessive grants of monopolies with the 
“Statute of Monopolies”, in France it was not until after the French Revolution that the patent 
system was reformed. While the intention of the reformers from 1791 was to abrogate the 
previous system of grants and privileges, in reality many institutional features survived. France 
                                                          
9 It comes from this tradition that the length of patents do not vary among branch or industry (David, 1993). 
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was the only country in which the natural right of the inventor to his invention played an 
important role in the discussion. In this vein the decree declared: “every discovery or 
invention, in every type of industry, is the property of its creator; the law therefore guarantees 
its full and entire enjoyment.” The actual clauses and the practice made clear though, that 
industrial development and mercantilist policies played at least an equally important role. An 
inventor lost his right to his invention if they tried to obtain a patent abroad. The importer of 
an invention new to the territory could also apply for patents, and the decree included a 
working requirement (Khan, 2002). 
 
The first patent laws on the American continent were passed during the second half of the 
17th century (Kaufer, 1989).10 These early versions drew heavily on the British model and 
granted patents for “such new inventions that are profitable for the Country”11 (David, 1993). 
The next major change to the American patent system did not come until 1782 when the first 
Article of the United States Constitution gave Congress the authority “to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries”. Eight years later Congress passed 
the first federal patent law (Kaufer, 1989). It included a clause that required an examination of 
novelty. Though for a short period of time replaced by a registration system, the examination 
of novelty was reintroduced in the patent statute from 1836, which also established a Patent 
Office to examine the claims and resembled in this sense the structure of the modern patent 
system. In contrast to the British and the French system which, in spite of numerous reforms, 
for a long time suffered from their historical origins as Crown privileges, the American system 
was affordable – at least for nationals – and was transparent and predictable. The American 
patent law recycled the phrase used in the British patent law concerning the “true and first 
inventor” just that this time it was used literally. As a consequence Americans could not apply 
for “import patents”. The American patent law continued to discriminate against foreign 
inventors however. Initially, foreigners were not allowed to obtain a patent at all. 
Subsequently, followers could place claims but had to pay patent fees that were about one 
hundred times as high as those for nationals12 and were subject to a working requirement 
(Khan, 2002).  
 
The views among German states concerning patent protection differed greatly. Prussia13, 
under a free-trade oriented government, dismissed patents as mercantilist policy. Other 
countries however, most notably the territories close to the Rhine, adopted a French style 
                                                          
10 Massachusetts (1641), Connecticut (1672) and South Carolina (1691) (Kaufer, 1989). 
11 Patent law passed by the General Court of Massachusetts Bay in 1641 (David, 1993). 
12 British nationals were an exception – they faced even higher fees (Khan, 2002). 
13 In spite of its free trade position - which it followed roughly since its defeat by Napoleon in 1806 - Prussia had 
a patent law in place since 1815. But the law was designed to minimise the potential threat of monopolies by the 
inclusion of an examination of newness, working requirements, the exclusion of agricultural machinery and 
pharmaceuticals, an obligation to disclose the patent information, and a short patent length (Kaufer, 1989). 
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patent system. The increasing dominance of Prussia over other German territories added 
further tension to the patent question. Prussia was pushing for a German free trade area and 
patents were considered as barriers to trade. After a lively debate and strong lobbying from 
industrialists and inventors, Germany implemented a national patent law in 187714, which was 
one of the most business friendly of its time (Khan, 2002). While in the beginning inventors 
and industrialists together pushed for the implementation of a national patent law the 
diverging interests of the two groups soon prevailed. The requirement for disclosure, the high 
and over time rising patent fees, and the transferability of patent ownership as well as working 
requirements and compulsory licensing in the end favoured companies over individual 
inventors. In 1891 utility models15 were introduced, which suited the needs of inventors with 
little capital. The coexistence of a rather business friendly patent law and utility models on a 
registration basis complemented each other (Khan, 2002). While the German patent law was 
one of the most stringent of its time, it still tolerated the infringement of foreign IPRs by 
German companies on a regular basis. Since British companies suffered especially from trade 
mark violations by German companies, they revised the Merchandise Mark Act in 1887 in 
order to make it mandatory to specify the country of manufacture.  This did not have the 
desired effect however (Chang, 2001; Khan, 2002).  
 
Although the anti-patent movement in Germany was defeated by the intensive lobbying of 
industrialists, the movement in other countries was more successful. The Netherlands 
abolished its patent law in 1869, while Switzerland simply refused to implement a patent law 
until 1907. An interesting development in these two cases was that industrialists took up an 
anti-patent position, unlike in Germany. Due to their lack of patent protection Switzerland 
and the Netherlands are especially interesting case studies. Schiff (1971) analysed the 
economic development of the Netherlands and Switzerland in the time when they had no 
patent law and compared this period to a period when they had such a law. Further, he 
compared their development in the period when they were without a patent law to the 
experiences of other European countries at that time. His comparisons of the number of 
patents held by Swiss and Dutch nationals in other countries during the time without a patent 
law and afterwards did not deliver any conclusive evidence. While Schiff found slight 
evidence, that “the reintroduction of a patent system in 1912 [has] given an extra spur to 
Dutch inventive capacity” and that during the time without patent laws industrial progress in 
the Netherlands relied to a greater degree on foreign invention than afterwards, there is no 
similar evidence for Switzerland (Schiff, 1971). Swiss inventors were – measured by patent 
applications in other countries – among the most productive before and after the introduction 
of a patent system. Among the important inventions made without a national patent system 
                                                          
14 A factor favouring the introduction of a federal patent law was that by that time Prussia had already abandoned 
its free trade position (Kaufer, 1989). 
15 Utility Models (Gebrauchsmuster) were granted on registration basis for three years (with a maximum length 
of six years) and required a lower degree of novelty than ordinary patents (Kurz, 2000).  
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were the Honegger loom, Sulzer Steam engine, milk chocolate, and instant soup to name just a 
few (Schiff, 1971). Regarding the industrial progress of the two countries a similar picture 
appears. While the progress of industrialisation was rapid in Switzerland during its period 
without a patent law, and the absence of a patent law did not even deter foreign investment, 
the case of the Netherlands is less decisive. The progress of industrialisation in the 
Netherlands was rather moderate but it still compared well with most other European nations. 
However, trade, which had a historically important role in the Netherlands, and not industry, 
remained the main pillar of the economy. On the other hand, a case study of two Dutch 
industries indicates that at least in their case the absence of patent protection was a supporting 
rather than hindering factor (Schiff, 1971). So while for the Netherlands at least, Schiff could 
not find conclusive evidence for negative effects from the abolition of the patent law, in the 
Swiss case it seems as if the absence of patent protection actually fostered its industrial 
development.  
 
Moser (2005) raises another interesting issue in her paper. In contrast to Schiff she focuses on 
the direction rather than the rate of innovation. Analysing data from 19th century World Fairs, 
Moser found that the absence of patent protection influences the choice of technological 
change since in countries without patent protection innovative activity focuses on industries 
(e.g. food processing, dye stuffs and scientific instrument) where other viable mechanisms of 
protection, such as secrecy, exist. Moser suggests that in the long run the lack of IPRs did 
have a negative effect on economic development since it stirred innovation away from the 
future leading sectors, manufacturing and machinery, which are highly dependent on patent 
protection. This however, as Moser points out, should not be considered as a reason for 
developing countries to introduce stronger IPR protection since this would only redirect their 
innovative activity towards sectors in which competition from developed countries is strong16 
(Moser, 2005). 
 
In sum, Schiff (1971) and Moser’s (2005) findings lend some support to the weak patent 
protection thesis. However, Schiff’s findings should not be overstated. Part of the reason why 
he could not find explicit differences between the countries within and outside patent 
protection as well as between the development of the countries before and after the 
introduction of a patent system could be found in the deficiencies of most of the patent 
systems of that time. Another reason could be that Swiss and Dutch nationals had the 
possibility to protect their inventions abroad. This along with the fact that both countries are 
rather small could have been a sufficient incentive for invention. Despite this, one should not 
simply dismiss the questions the history of these two countries raise. This is especially the case 
since the experience of other countries considered point to similar conclusions; namely that at 
                                                          
16 This different interpretation for the case of the Netherlands and Switzerland on the one hand and developing 
countries today on the other hand is attributed to their different position in the world economy. Neither the 
Netherlands nor Switzerland was a “backward country” from a global point of view.  
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an early stage of economic and industrial development the possibility to “learn” or copy from 
advanced countries was more important than the stimulation of national inventive capabilities. 
Most countries chose to violate the property rights of advanced countries until they were able 
to build their own ample industrial base (Kaufer, 1989).  
 
Before any firm conclusions are drawn however, we move on to consider more recent 
examples of successful industrialisers, and in particular those of Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan. A great deal of research has been undertaken investigating the “growth miracle” of a 
number of East Asian countries. Many factors have been identified as being important for the 
rapid and sustained growth of these countries. While there is still much disagreement about 
the causes it is widely accepted that the ability to adapt advanced technology was a crucial 
aspect (Kumar, 2002). 
 
The first Japanese patent law was launched in the course of the modernisation and 
industrialisation era fostered by the Meiji-Restoration. The Patent Monopoly Ordinance from 
1885, which was largely based on the U.S. and French patent law, was revised in 1888. After 
Japan's accession to the Paris Convention a new revision, which acknowledged the rights of 
foreigners became necessary. This version as well as the amendment for utility models which 
was passed in 1905 drew heavily on the German model (Kotabe, 1992). Japan, as with many 
countries in their early phase of industrialisation excluded pharmaceutical products, chemical 
compounds, food, and beverages from patentability until 1975 (Kumar, 2002). Besides 
deferred examination – the examination of a claim begins only if the applicant requests it and 
could be delayed by up to seven years – Japan’s patent system contained other abnormalities 
(Kotabe, 1991). Japan required pre-grant disclosure and allowed competitors to use the 
invention without approbation of the applicant or any royalty payments until the patent was 
issued. During this phase companies were also allowed to oppose the patent, which could 
considerably lengthen the examination phase since the applicant was required to give a written 
response to all oppositions (Maskus and McDaniel, 1999). This was shrewdly used by Japanese 
firms to slow down the actual granting of a patent (Kotabe, 1992). This procedure both 
lowered the protection term, which started with the filing of the application and fostered 
technological diffusion by allowing competitors to use the invention during the examination 
phase and even allowed for follow-up patents (or utility models) if a substantial improvement 
was made. There were considerable complaints about this practice from foreigners, who seem 
to have been more strongly affected than nationals. For Japanese companies it took about 1-3 
years from the application to the grant of a patent, while the same procedure took about 7-8 
years for a foreign firm (Maskus and McDaniel, 1999; Kotabe, 1992). Kotabe (1992) presents 
empirical evidence indicating that foreign firms were indeed discriminated against.  
 
Of more importance than the question of whether or not the Japanese patent system 
discriminated against foreigners is whether it was suited to advance the country’s technological 
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and economic development. This issue is considered by both Ordover (1991) and Maskus and 
McDaniel (1999). Ordover (1991) analysed the specifics of the Japanese patent system and 
came to the conclusion that “[t]he Japanese patent system subordinates the short-term interest 
of the innovator in the creation of exclusionary rights to the broader policy goals of diffusion 
of technology” (Ordover, 1991). A narrow patent breadth, weak novelty requirements and 
pre-grant disclosure in Japan tended to favour technological diffusion, reverse engineering and 
small modifications on existing inventions rather than “major technological breakthroughs”. 
In conclusion, Ordover (1991) states that the Japanese patent system was especially suited for 
a technology importing country.  
 
Maskus and McDaniel (1999) reach a similar conclusion from their empirical analysis of the 
effect of the patent system on total factor productivity in post-war Japan. Their findings also 
suggest that the narrow breadth and pre-grant disclosure stimulated technological diffusion. 
They found that the patent system in place in Japan encouraged incremental and adaptive 
innovation and the diffusion of knowledge into the economy. This resulted from a number of 
measures, but most notably the use of utility models. Such utility models were found to have a 
large positive impact on Japanese TFP growth17.  Paradoxically these effects were stronger for 
domestic patents, indicating that the Japanese patent system worked better to diffuse domestic 
technological knowledge rather than foreign ones. It seems therefore that domestic innovation 
was more important than the imitation of foreign inventions for Japan’s growth in TFP 
between 1960 and 1993. While the direct impact of patent applications on TFP growth was 
smaller it was still positive, and patent applications were found to have an indirect impact on 
TFP growth through stimulating later utility models.  
 
South Korea's first patent law was implemented in 1961 and revised in 1981 in order to 
comply with the 1967 Stockholm revision of the Paris Convention. This patent law drew 
heavily on the Japanese Patent system prior to 1975, in particular regarding the range of 
product groups excluded from protection; food stuffs, luxury consumer goods, nuclear 
devices, chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Further the revision allowed for the granting of 
patents to foreigners, for multiple claims in a single patent application and it weakened the 
provisions for patent cancellation in the case of non-working of the patent. In 1986 the 
Republic of Korea again revised its patent law in response to increasing U.S. government 
pressure. The revision allowed for the protection for pharmaceuticals and chemicals and the 
protection term increased from 12 to 15 years. Despite these changes, enforcement remained 
a problem long after the revision of 1986 (La Croix and Kawaura, 1996). Kim (1997) points 
out that in the early phase of Korea's industrialisation reverse engineering and imitation played 
                                                          
17 Further case study evidence of the benefits of utility models includes Dahab (1986) who finds that utility 
models were important in allowing domestic producers to capture a significant share of the farm machinery 
industry by adapting foreign technology to local market conditions in Brazil and Mikkelsen (1984) who describes 
how such utility models allowed the successful adaptive innovation of rice threshers in the Philippines. 
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a crucial role, while only at a later stage of development did FDI and licensing become 
important. It is in the wake of this development that IPRs became an issue for local firms 
(Kim, 2003). Kumar (2002) highlights another aspect of the Republic of Korea’s patent law; 
utility models and industrial designs seemed to have served as a viable mechanism to foster 
local adaptation of foreign technology. This is evident from patent statistics, which indicate 
that 92-95 percent of all design patents and utility models are held by Korean nationals 
(Kumar, 2002). Kim (2002) argues further that in the early stages of development the Republic 
of Korea acquired and assimilated mature technologies in order to undertake duplicative 
imitation of existing foreign products with cheap skilled labour. Relatively few foreign firms 
patented technologies in the Republic of Korea because of its small market size and limited 
imitative threat. In addition to maintaining weak IPR standards, he argues that the role of 
government was to promote exports and to encourage the development of technical and 
engineering skills. 
 
Kumar (2002) argues that IPR protection in Taiwan was weak to encourage the diffusion of 
knowledge, with the government openly encouraging counterfeiting as a means of developing 
local industries. Taiwan implemented legislation on IPRs in 1949. The patent law 
distinguished between three different types of protection: invention patents, utility models and 
design patents, with the former granting protection for 10 years and the latter two for 5 years. 
The patent law provided protection for manufacturing processes and products only however. 
The Taiwanese patent law passed through several revisions (in 1959, 1960, 1979, 1986 and 
1994). The revision of 1979 introduced IPR protection for agricultural and extractive 
industries. Chemicals and pharmaceuticals remained unprotected however, while working 
requirements and comprehensive provisions for compulsory licensing were maintained. 
Moreover, the maximum fine for patent infringement was approximately 1,300 U.S. dollars. In 
addition to the relatively weak IPR protection on the statute books enforcement of the laws 
was also lax (Lo, 2004). As an unattributed government document suggests the design of the 
patent law was a deliberate decision: “The R.O.C [Republic of China] government has viewed 
imitation as a necessary process in the evolution of human civilization and believed that 
commercial counterfeiting is an inevitable phenomenon in most developing countries” 
(quoted in Wade, 1990). The 1994 revision of the patent law extended patent protection to 
beverages, food and micro-organisms among other things and expanded the protection term 
to 20 years for patents, 12 years for utility models and 10 years for design patents. While there 
has also been progress on the issue of enforcement, concerns still remain.18 
 
Both Taiwan and South Korea managed to upgrade their technological capabilities and switch 
from imitation to innovation within roughly one generation (Hu and Jaffe, 2001). It is evident 
that the role of IPRs in these countries as well as in Japan was, if anything, just one of the 
                                                          
18 For example prison penalties are only possible in the case of infringement of utility models or design patents, 
which are mostly held by Taiwanese nationals. (Kumar, 2002). 
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many aspects that facilitated this process of catching-up. These countries made a deliberate 
effort to master advanced technology by directing their policies in many different fields, 
including education, taxation, and investment. While the relative importance of IPRs in this 
process is unclear it can be argued that a level of protection which is considered too weak 
from a developed country’s point of view need not impede economic growth. Moreover, it 
appears that all three countries intentionally designed their patent law to best suit their 
economic needs. In addition, these three countries provided incentives for local firms to 
conduct adaptive innovation of foreign products, in particular the use of utility models. 
Finally, all three countries provided rather weak protection at the beginning of their 
industrialisation phase, gradually increasing their protection level as industrialisation advanced. 
Compared to the developing countries of today, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan in the 
early stages of their industrialisation enjoyed considerable freedom regarding the design of 
their patent laws (Kim, 1997).  
 
Further case-study examples include Kumar (2002) who documents the experience of India. 
While inheriting a relatively strong IPR regime from colonial times that provided protection 
for most industries, considerable pressure built up from Indian firms in the 1960s that were 
unable to develop their own technology due to foreign patent holders who were restricting 
entry. This was particularly the case in the chemicals and pharmaceuticals industries and led to 
a new patent act that reduced the scope of patentability in food, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals to processes and not products. It is widely accepted that these changes helped 
facilitate the development of local technological capability in chemicals and pharmaceuticals19. 
Kumar argues that the experience of India indicates the importance of weak IPR protection in 
building up local capabilities, even in countries at very low levels of development. 
 
Maskus (2000c) examines the likely effects of introducing stronger IPR protection in the 
Lebanon, using survey data on 117 manufacturing and services firms. IPRs are seen as 
unimportant in many industries, and where patents are applied for they tend to be for minor 
improvements and disclosure does not provide for effective technology transfer. Whilst 
acknowledging their shortcomings, Maskus uses partial equilibrium models to calculate the 
impact of stronger IPR protection in different industries. For most industries he finds that the 
static effects of stronger IPR protection on prices, employment and output are likely to be 
negative. He goes on to suggest that dynamic gains from stronger IPR protection are possible, 
however, through increased FDI, increased product development by local firms (particularly 
in cosmetics, food products, software applications, publishing and film production), and the 
increased ability to enter into joint ventures or product licensing. Further, to the extent that 
                                                          
19 Fink (2001) simulates the effects of the introduction of IPR protection on two therapeutic drugs in India. The 
results suggest that the impact of offering IPR protection can be higher prices and significant welfare losses, but 
that non-patented therapeutic substitutes to a patented drug can limit the extent of price increases and reduce 
welfare losses. 
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these lead to additional technology transfer and local product development, the average quality 
of local products should rise. 
 
Survey evidence from China reveals that managers of foreign enterprises are reluctant to 
locate R&D facilities in China for fear of misappropriation and patent infringement (Maskus 
et al., 2005). Enforcement problems and weak penalties were also a concern. These factors led 
firms that transferred technology to China not to use the latest technology, but technologies 
that were at least five years behind the frontier. Chinese firms were also found to suffer from 
trademark infringement, which in the long run is likely to be particularly damaging to 
enterprise development.  
 
To summarise, in the cases of Western European countries and the United States the patent 
law in these countries played an important role in their industrialisation. One should keep in 
mind that these early versions of patent laws normally did not protect foreign intellectual 
property, and in reality the patent law was used to acquire foreign technologies to spur 
technology transfer at an early stage of industrialisation. Thus, while industrialisation in these 
countries was surely facilitated by reducing the risk for entrepreneurs via IPRs provision, 
many features of their modern patent law were severely underdeveloped at the time of rapid 
industrialisation in both Europe and northern America. More recent examples point in a 
similar direction. At an early stage of industrialisation the patent laws in Japan, the Republic of 
Korea’s and Taiwan included some unusual provisions, which indicate that informal 
technology transfer was considered an important issue. Other countries at an early stage of 
industrialisation opted for no or negligible IPRs, examples being Switzerland and the 
Netherlands. The experiences of these countries are summarised by Kaufer (1989):  
 
“The historical experience with industrialization in Holland, Germany, and 
Switzerland shows that it may be advantageous not to have a patent law, 
assuming that domestic inventive capabilities are sufficient to “free-ride” by 
imitating the technologies already developed by foreign enterprise. Only after 
industrialization has progressed further and technical skills have developed to a 
higher level does the nation introduce a national patent system to guide its 
domestic inventive activity away from imitation and towards more original 
work.” (Kaufer, 1989). 
 
There are substantial caveats to these findings. Most importantly, the technological gap 
between the developed and developing world has grown substantially since the start of the 
catching-up process of Taiwan and the Republic of Korea. While these countries have been 
able to master some parts of advanced technology by reverse engineering, this might not be 
possible for late-comer countries today. These countries might be dependent on formal 
transfers of technology therefore, which have the advantage that they not only include the 
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codified knowledge but also tacit knowledge and in some cases even some assistance on how 
to master it. These formal channels of technology transfer, which include FDI and licensing, 
are likely to be influenced by the level of IPRs. On the other hand, it seems to be the case that 
at least the more advanced developing countries are still able to master foreign technology by 
reverse engineering, since otherwise the pressure for stronger IPRs would not have been so 
fierce.  
 
2.2. Development of a Global Intellectual Property Rights Regime 
 
In the 19th century the lack of international agreements on IPRs led most advanced countries 
to turn to other instruments in order to sustain their technological lead, examples being the 
prohibition of emigration of skilled workers or of machinery exports. Some European 
countries also protected intellectual property through bilateral commercial treaties 
(UNCTAD-ICTSD, 2003)20. By the end of the 19th century however these measures were 
deemed insufficient. The Vienna Congress was held in 1873 with the aim of creating an 
international agreement on patent rights, but ended in failure largely due to the objections of 
the United States to “compulsory working requirements”21. It was not until 1883 that the first 
convention on that subject was ratified. The “Paris Convention of the International Union for 
the Protection of Industrial Property” was ratified by 11 countries – among them the 
Netherlands and Switzerland, which at this time did not even possess a patent law – and 
covered patents and trademarks. In 1886 a subsequent Convention on Copyrights was signed 
in Bern (Chang, 2001). The secretariats for the Paris and the Bern Conventions were merged 
in 1893 and were replaced by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1967. 
Seven years later WIPO became a specialised agency of the United Nations. The Paris and the 
Bern Conventions, which were both revised numerous times, constituted the basic principle 
of the international IPR regime for more than 100 years (Drahos, 1998). The main provisions 
of the Paris Convention were “national treatment” and “preferential filing”. “National 
treatment” simply implies that nationals and foreigners were treated equally, while 
“preferential filing” or “priority rights” give inventors the exclusive right to file a patent on 
their invention in any member country within one year of the first application. Apart from 
that the signatory countries mostly retained control over the design of their national patent 
laws, for instance regarding the issue of compulsory licensing or the general exclusion of 
certain product groups from protection (Siebeck et al., 1990). The “international phase”, as 
Drahos (1998) refers to this time, was thus characterised by substantial freedom for the 
signatory countries. This was partly due to the fact that there were no actual enforcement 
mechanisms in place. While in later versions of the agreements countries had, at least in 
                                                          
20 Most of these agreements focused on trademarks. By the time the Paris Convention was implemented 69 such 
treaties existed (Drahos, 1998). 
21 Working requirements were part of the national patent law in Austria and some other countries.  
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principle, the option to appeal to the International Court of Justice this never happened in 
practice (Dinwoodie, 2007). 
 
In the decades following World War II most colonies became independent. Long after 
independence the IPR regime in these countries often reflected those of their respective 
colonisers. Some countries however started to reassess their intellectual property systems to 
better suit their national objectives. Moreover, an increasing number of these newly 
independent countries joined the Paris and Bern Convention, shifting the power structure 
within these Conventions22. These and other developing countries made attempts to revise the 
Paris and the Bern Conventions to generate an international system of intellectual property 
protection that was more in line with their specific perceptions. While in the case of the Bern 
Convention23 their push for revision was successful, in the case of the Paris Convention no 
agreement could be reached (Drahos, 1998 and 2000).  
 
Whatever the reasons for the failure to revise the Paris Convention, the consequent reactions 
of developed countries – and the United States in particular – were not anticipated by 
developing countries. As May (2000, p. 84) points out; “The pressure to further weaken 
international IPR protection regimes may well have alerted developed states to actual 
problems caused by WIPO’s stewardship [...]”. These problems included the many different 
agreements that in many cases had few signatories and the lack of enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure compliance of those countries that actually signed (May, 2000). These and other 
problems with the existing conventions gave developing countries the freedom to exclude 
some product groups (including pharmaceuticals, food stuff, chemicals, plant varieties and 
other biotechnological inventions) from protection, to provide only rudimentary and poor 
protection for copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets, and to reserve the right to compulsory 
licensing (Maskus, 1998b).  
 
Problems with the existing IPR regime along with the increasing inability of developed 
countries to push through their choice of IPRs in WIPO based agreements (Drahos, 1998) 
and changes in economic activity that made knowledge based industries key to a country’s 
competitiveness generated considerable pressure in developed countries for a fundamental 
change in the international IPR regime (May, 2000). The major pressure for change came from 
American companies, and in particular firms in film, software and pharmaceutical industries, 
which lobbied for internationally recognised and enforced IPRs. These well organised and 
often oligopolistic industries made the strengthening of IPRs one of the most important 
topics of U.S. commercial policy. In the 1980s the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
used Section 301, an amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, to pressure countries to 
strengthen their IPRs. This amendment was followed by the Omnibus Trade and 
                                                          
22  WIPO conventions, as with all UN organisations, operated under a system of “one country, one vote”.  
23 The Stockholm Protocol was signed in 1967.  
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Competitiveness Act (1988) which extended the 301 provision by differentiating between 
‘Regular 301’, ‘Special 301’ and ‘Super 301’ processes. These regulations obliged U.S. trade 
representatives to identify countries with insufficient IP protection and engage in bilateral 
negotiations with those countries. In the case of an unsatisfactory outcome trade sanctions 
could be imposed (Drahos, 1998).  
 
At the outset of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in 1986 the U.S. pushed for the 
introduction of IPRs as one of the negotiating topics, despite the protests and reservations of 
many developing countries, including Argentina, Brazil, India, and Nigeria (Drahos, 2002). 
The move to include IPRs in the Uruguay trade talks can be seen as an effort to shift the topic 
to a forum where the power relations are more favourable for IPR advocates than the WIPO 
forum. As Drahos (2002, p. 10) writes;  
 
“In fora such as WIPO, UNCTAD and UNESCO, the US faced the problem 
that developing country blocs could defeat its proposals on intellectual property 
or advance their own. The US began to argue the issue of intellectual property 
protection should become the subject of a multilateral trade negotiation within 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT was a forum 
in which the US was the single most influential player.”  
 
Others argue that IPRs belong in the trade sphere, emphasising the fact that IPRs do affect 
trade flows and a lack of IPRs does distort trade24 (Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights, 2002, pp. 159-160). While there is increasing evidence that IPRs do significantly 
influence trade flows, there are apparent advantages for Western countries from shifting the 
issue of IPRs to the WTO too. Aside from more favourable power relations, the WTO did 
possess a dispute settlement mechanism25 and hence better enforcement mechanisms than 
WIPO. Furthermore making TRIPS an integral part of the WTO accelerated the spread of the 
higher standards since a country striving to become a WTO member had no option to opt out 
from TRIPS and finally shifting IPR issues to the WTO negotiation gave advanced countries 
the possibility to include the TRIPS agreement in a broader bargaining package (UNCTAD-
ICTSD, 2003). 
 
                                                          
24 “Thus, a firm making export decisions across different markets faces an array of effective levels of patent 
protection. If the firm takes this array into account, trade will be “distorted” in the sense that policy parameters 
will influence its international distribution”. However the authors further point out that this is a rather 
uncommon definition of distorted as “there is no clear standard for defining global optimality against which to 
assess the trade impacts” (Maskus and Penubarti, 1995: p. 229). 
25 Strictly speaking the WTO did not exist at that time but the preceding agreement, the GATT, did possess a 
dispute settlement mechanism. The WTO was established with the finalisation of the Uruguay Round in 1995.  
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While it is quite evident why developed countries sought to include IPRs in the new world 
trade regime, the question remains as to why developing countries accepted this move, since 
they displayed an attitude to its incorporation which ranged from concerned to hostile in the 
beginning (UNCTAD-ICTSD, 2003). Yu (2006) argues that there are four answers to this 
question, namely; (i) ‘bargaining’, (ii) ‘coercion’, (iii) ‘ignorance’ and (iv) ‘self-interest’. The 
‘bargaining narrative’ emphasises that developing countries agreed to TRIPS as a broader 
bargaining package, in which developed countries made concessions regarding lower tariffs on 
agriculture and textiles in return – subjects that were by many developing countries considered 
far more important than IPRs. The ‘coercion narrative’ considers TRIPS a neo-imperialistic 
document that was forced upon the developing countries by threatening to exclude them from 
the global trading system or by using ‘Section 301’ processes. The ‘ignorance narrative’ 
emphasises that developing countries did not understand the full impact and the importance 
of the issue. While this argument cannot be entirely dismissed since the full impact of stronger 
IPRs is not even clear today, it may exaggerate the ignorance of developing countries. If this 
heterogeneous country group was so ignorant about the relevance of IPR protection, it would 
not have tried to reverse the Paris and Bern Convention in the 1960s and 1980s. The last 
narrative suggests that developing countries agreed to TRIPS simply because it was in their 
own interest. If this were the case however, developed countries were rather ill-advised to 
make concessions to the developing countries in order to make them accept TRIPS. In other 
words the ‘self-interest narrative’ seems to be contradictory to the ‘bargaining narrative’. While 
the first three narratives are in no way mutually exclusive the ‘self-interest narrative’ does not 
fit well with any of the other narratives26 (Yu, 2006: pp. 371-379). While it is unlikely that any 
of the narratives tells the whole story, the first three narratives may all contribute to the 
motivation of developing countries to accept TRIPS.  
 
3. On the Economics of IPRS 
 
In a thorough study of the US patent system conducted in 1958 for the US congress Machlup 
concluded:  
 
“If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of 
our present day knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend 
instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would 
be irresponsible, on the basis of our present day knowledge, to recommend 
abolishing it.” (Machlup, 1958: p. 80). 
 
                                                          
26 However the ‘self-interest narrative’ raises an important aspect. If the technological necessities of developing 
countries are different from those of developed countries, IP protection in the South is necessary to stimulate 
research in these areas. In this case the South does have a self-interest in protecting intellectual assets. This issue 
has been investigated in greater detail by Diwan and Rodrik (1993). However the negotiation history of TRIPS 
suggests that, while this is a potentially important aspect, the South at least did not consider it as such.    
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Since then an extensive amount of research on the economics of the patent system has been 
conducted and more light has been shed on the issue. In what follows we briefly review the 
reasons for market failure in knowledge production, possible solutions to this inefficiency, and 
their respective economic consequences. We further discuss the trade-off for society between 
knowledge production and diffusion.  
 
3.1. Knowledge Production and Market Failure 
 
Knowledge, as Arrow (1962) pointed out in his essay “Economic Welfare and the Allocation 
of Resources for Invention” has the properties of a public good. First, it is non-rivalrous in 
consumption. It stems from this property that an efficient allocation of knowledge requires 
that nobody is excluded from its use since the marginal cost of providing knowledge to an 
additional individual is zero27. Further it is non-excludable in use or as Arrow pointed out: 
“The very use of information in any productive way is bound to reveal it, at least in part” 
(Arrow, 1962: p. 615). So while it follows from the first property that “no one should be 
excluded” from the use of knowledge the second property states that “no one can be 
excluded” from its use (Stiglitz, 1999: p. 309). The public good characteristics of knowledge 
generate problems regarding the production and dissemination of innovation. If inventors do 
not get the chance to profit from their invention, since everybody can and should use the 
knowledge they produced the only knowledge that would be produced is knowledge with zero 
production costs. This of course leads to an insufficient level of invention and innovation 
from an economic point of view (Stiglitz, 1999: p. 309).  
 
Knowledge in most respects can also be considered a global – as opposed to a local – public 
good. Even though the value of some forms of knowledge (e.g. knowledge about a country’s 
legal system) is limited to a specific country, knowledge that is embodied in patents and 
henceforth relevant in this context is most of the time valid worldwide (Stiglitz, 1999: pp. 310-
311). It is the global public good28 characteristic of knowledge that makes the theoretical case 
for the international regulation of knowledge usage and dissemination, since national provisions 
will not take account of cross-border externalities and thus, will not be globally optimal 
(Maskus and Reichman, 2005).  
 
                                                          
27 This does not imply that there are no costs for the transmission of knowledge. The marginal costs of 
knowledge transmission may be significant. However, this does not have an effect on the public good properties 
of knowledge (Stiglitz, 1999).  
28 Maskus and Reichman (2005) define global public goods as: “those goods (including policies and 
infrastructure) that are systematically underprovided by private market forces and for which such under-
provision has important international externality effects” (p. 8).   
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3.2. Patents – A Trade-Off between Diffusion and Appropriability in a Closed Economy29 
 
A private market solution for knowledge production is destined to lead to an insufficient level 
of invention and innovation. Consequently some form of government intervention is 
necessary to stimulate research investment. One possible solution is the provision of IPRs. 
However, granting property rights to one party to ensure that they gain the fruits of their 
research investment by definition excludes others from the usage of this knowledge. This 
creates an inescapable trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency considerations. From a 
static point of view everybody should have access to knowledge at marginal cost, which is 
close to zero.  From a dynamic point of view however, an incentive mechanism is required to 
encourage innovation. Strong IPRs provide powerful incentives for research. However, they 
also generate distortions through insufficient access and may transfer surpluses from 
consumers to inventors. Conversely, weak IPRs while satisfying the static goal, namely 
diffusion, may not create the necessary incentives for firms to invest in research. Welfare 
considerations imply that one must find the optimal balance between these two efficiency 
requirements. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the basic trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency requirements. 
Static efficiency requires that a newly invented product is made available at its marginal costs 
() which is associated with the price , the quantity  and a consumer surplus  . At 
this price the innovator does not earn any rents, implying that the firm earns no return on its 
research expenditures. Consequently no research would be conducted, the product would not 
be developed in the first place and the entire consumer benefits would not accrue. Therefore, 
the solution  associated with the competitive price is not attainable. Alternatively, if IPRs are 
granted the product would be available at the monopoly price , the inventor would earn 
 as rents and the consumer surplus would ‘shrink’ to  compared to the 
competitive (but not attainable) price. Without IPRs the entire consumer benefits would be 
lost - assuming that in this case the product remains undeveloped - but under a system of 
IPRs society would gain the monopoly profits  minus R&D expenditures plus the 
consumer surplus  (Maskus, 2000a: pp. 28-30).  
 
  
                                                          
29 The following basic theoretical discussion does not consider the effects of any market mechanisms (lead-time, 
moving down the learning curve quickly and so on) that can have an impact on the ability of firms to appropriate 
the returns from their research investment.  
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Figure 1: Trade-off from IPRs 
 
 
  (Source: Maskus 2000a: p. 30) 
 
The costs due to the temporary monopoly provided by the granting of a patent are therefore 
justified by the necessity of creating incentives for invention and innovation. This implies that 
patents should only be granted as long as the benefits outweigh the costs (Mazzoleni and 
Nelson, 1998: p. 275). In addition to the deadweight loss associated with the temporary 
monopoly, there is another shortcoming of IPRs as a means of stimulating R&D and 
innovation. Ideally the system of IPRs would be designed to create just those innovations for 
which R&D costs are just below the ex-post consumer surplus. It is not possible to create a 
system that is so precise however. Thus, IPRs remain a second-best solution to the problem 
of inappropriability (Maskus, 2000a: p. 30).  
 
3.3. Other Solutions: Awards and Contract Research  
 
The costs associated with granting IPRs lead to the question of whether there are other 
incentive mechanisms with superior properties than IPRs. Awards and contract research can 
theoretically generate the necessary incentive mechanisms. As with patents, awards have a 
long tradition as an incentive for innovation. In 1713 the British Board of Longitude offered a 
prize for a special chronometer, which was awarded to John Harrison in 1762 (Wright, 1983: 
p. 704). Similar to contract research, awards are under some conditions able to generate the 
same research incentives as IPRs whilst at the same time having the virtue of avoiding the 
deadweight loss generated by monopoly pricing. However, awards and research contracts also 
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produce market distortions since the prizes have to be financed through public taxes. It 
follows from the general theory of taxation though that the broader the tax base the smaller 
the distortion. Therefore, in the case of symmetric information, where firms and the social 
planner both know the values and costs of innovation, IPRs are not preferred over other 
mechanisms of appropriability. In general however, this is not the case. Neither costs nor 
social value are known beforehand to the social planner and thus the “correct” prize for an 
innovation cannot be evaluated30. In this case IPRs have the advantage in that the decision 
over whether or not to invest in R&D is left to firms who can be expected to have better 
information about the costs and benefits of R&D investment. Moreover, rather than imposing 
costs on the general public IPRs charge the actual users of knowledge (Gallini and Scotchmer, 
2002: pp. 54-55).31 
 
3.4. Properties and Function of the Patent System in a Closed Economy 
 
Granting IPRs can stimulate innovation but creates costs to society.  Consequently in an 
‘ideal’ world IPRs should only be granted for inventions that would have not been made in the 
absence of IPRs.32 If no other mechanisms for appropriating the returns from R&D exist and 
perfect competition prevails, as in the theoretical discussion above, this is very likely to be the 
case. However, in a more realistic setting firms may have other possibilities (secrecy, lead time, 
rapidly moving down the learning curve, image advantages for first-movers, sales or service 
efforts, non-patent barriers to market entrance) to appropriate the returns from investment 
(Scherer, 2005: p. 3). A number of studies have attempted to evaluate the relative importance 
of IPRs for different industries. Taylor and Silberston (1973), Mansfield (1986), and Levin et 
al. (1987) are among the earlier studies of this kind. Their findings are rather similar and are 
not very supportive of the effectiveness of patent protection. Levin et al. (1987) find that with 
the exception of a few industries, predominantly pharmaceuticals and chemicals33 lead time, 
sales or service efforts, and moving down the learning curve are considerably more effective 
than patents in product protection. In a similar vein Mansfield (1986) finds that the absence of 
IPRs would have only minor effects on innovative efforts in most industries, with 
                                                          
30 There are some cases where the social planner knows the value of an investment, e.g. in the case of military 
equipment where the social planner actually determines its value (Gallini and Scotchmer, 2002: p. 55). 
31 Wright (1983) in one of the first formal studies on these three incentive mechanisms came to the conclusion 
that IPRs were the preferred second-best option. However his analysis suggests that for a number of reasons 
(e.g. common pool problem, nature of research process and so on) “(...) the range of situations in which a 
practical patent system dominates other feasible alternatives may be narrower than is commonly believed (...)” (p. 
704). 
32 It should be noted that there are other reasons for granting IPRs than fostering innovation, which will be 
considered later.  
33 The problems of appropriability are especially high in these industries, since the composition of 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals is easily revealed once the product is on the market (Maskus, 2000a: p. 50). 
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pharmaceuticals and chemicals again being the main exceptions34. These results are supported 
by the more recent study of Cohen et al (2000) who find that in the majority of industries 
secrecy and lead time are the most effective appropriability mechanisms. Moreover, they find 
evidence that firms patent not only to directly profit from their innovation through licensing 
or commercialisation but also for strategic reasons (for example, patent blocking, prevention 
of suits, use of patents in negotiations).   
 
While these findings on the limited effectiveness of patents pose some questions about the 
usefulness of a patent system, the results should not be overstated and have to be interpreted 
with care. Firstly, all of these studies focused on large established firms and there are a 
number of reasons to suggest that the situation might be different for small firms and new 
entrants. Secondly, in addition to encouraging innovation IPRs serve other purposes which 
were not considered in these studies (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998: p. 274). For small firms 
and new entrants the ability to protect their intellectual property might be considerably more 
important than for large established firms which may have other mechanisms of 
appropriability at their disposal. Many small firms may lack the necessary resources to 
commercialise their innovation. These firms may find it more convenient to license their 
invention to larger companies who then carry on the product development and 
commercialisation of the product. Even where small firms or new entrants decide to 
commercialise their innovation themselves patents can play a crucial role. Such firms will very 
likely find it necessary to turn to the capital market to raise funds, in which case holding a 
patent can be a decisive asset (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998: p. 277). 
 
The argument that IPRs induces commercialisation of new products is, in the case of large 
established firms that both invent and commercialise new products, very similar to the basic 
argument for generating incentives for R&D investments. However, as already outlined in the 
case of small firms and new entrants the focus on commercialisation of an invention makes a 
relevant difference. Furthermore, in cases where the original invention would have been made 
with or without patent protection (e.g. by universities or government research) IPRs might 
play an important role for commercialisation. In this case the “commercialisation argument” is 
contradictory to the “incentive for invention” argument, since it argues for the granting of 
IPR protection even when the invention has already been made. However, under the 
assumption that further research investment is needed to develop the original invention into a 
commercial product and that no patent can be filed for further development work (e.g. since 
the inventive step is too small to meet the necessary conditions) no private firm will be willing 
to make the investment unless some property rights over the initial invention can be obtained. 
                                                          
34 For four industries (textiles, rubber, motor vehicles, and office equipment) the absence of IPRs would have 
made no difference to their inventive efforts. For the bulk of other industries the percentage of products that 
would have been undeveloped ranges from 4% to 18%, while only in the chemical (30%) and pharmaceutical 
(65%) industries would a major portion of products been undeveloped (Mansfield, 1986: p. 175). 
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This argument is subject to two reservations. Firstly, in many areas it is possible to obtain 
patents on the development work. Secondly, as for the “incentive to invent” argument there 
are alternative market mechanisms to appropriate the returns from research investment 
(Mazzoleni and Nelson 1998: 277-278). 
 
Kitch (1977) proposes a further argument that has been termed prospect theory, which argues 
that the absence of a broad patent on an invention is likely to lead to duplicative and wasteful 
R&D efforts for follow-on inventions, since many people see the same possibilities. In this 
case only a broad patent on the initial invention can assure the orderly development of follow-
on inventions either by the patentee or their licensors (p. 266-271). Merges and Nelson (1990) 
however raise doubts about the assumption that many people see the same prospects and 
suggest that many people see many different prospects. Consequently a single rights holder 
might under-develop the original invention. Indeed, one of the basic arguments for patent 
protection is information disclosure. The possibility of protecting relevant information 
through patents induces the inventor to reveal the information to the public and in doing so 
adds to the public stock of knowledge (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998). Once the patent 
application is released to the public competitors can gain access to the information and, 
depending on the scope of patent protection, can invent around the original patent and 
thereby raise long-term competition (Maskus, 2000a).  
 
So while empirical studies have raised doubts about the importance of a patent system as the 
most important incentive mechanism for invention for large established firms and the 
majority of industries, there are a range of other potential positive effects of granting IPR 
protection. At the same time IPRs have considerable disadvantages, which have resulted in a 
significant amount of research focussing on the properties of the “optimal” patent system.  
 
3.5. Length, Breadth, and Height of the “Optimal Patent” 
 
There are numerous studies which have focused on the optimal design of a patent system that 
maximises social welfare by optimally balancing negative and positive effects. Earlier studies 
often focused solely on patent life (duration of protection) while later studies included 
considerations about the optimal patent breadth (scope of protection) as well.  A minority of 
studies investigate the height of patent protection (i.e. novelty requirements for protection). 
 
One of the earliest studies of this kind was Nordhaus’ work on the optimal patent life 
(Nordhaus, 1967). The study focuses on “run-of-the-mill” inventions under perfect 
competition, which are cost reducing inventions,35 and which leave the pre-invention price 
                                                          
35 His findings can be applied to the more general case of product inventions as well (Kaufer 1989: p. 25). 
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and quantity unaltered36. Furthermore Nordhaus assumed that during the patent term the 
patentee gains the entire monopoly profit while immediately after expiration of the patent 
term competition eliminates any rents (Scherer, 1972, p. 423). Maximising the benefits to 
producers and consumers subject to any given patent term, Nordhaus obtained the welfare-
maximising patent term, which depends on the price elasticity of demand, the “importance of 
the invention”, the discount rate, and on the elasticity of cost reduction with respect to R&D 
investment. Furthermore he found that the optimal patent life is shorter for more important 
inventions37, since they have a greater social impact and thus produce a greater deadweight 
loss.  
 
Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990) expanded the analysis of the optimal patent 
system by including patent scope in their models. Patent scope corresponds to “the size of the 
region of technology space from which a patentee may exclude others from operating” (Jaffe 
1999, p. 23). In the case of an “independent single invention” the analysis of patent scope 
does not differ a great deal from the analysis of patent length. The broader the patent scope 
the higher the incentives for research and the higher the welfare loss from market power. In 
the case of cumulative research however, there are further aspects that have to be considered. 
On the one hand a broader patent promises higher returns to investment and thus stronger 
research incentives. On the other hand, an inventive firm anticipates that its potential 
invention might infringe on an existing patent and thus research becomes riskier and less 
valuable. Consequently broader patents can not only spur but also deter the rate of invention 
(Jaffe 1999, p. 23).  
 
Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990) both focus in their work on the optimal 
combination of patent length and breadth.  While Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) come to the 
conclusion that a longer patent life and a narrow breadth are optimal as long as broader 
patents are associated with increasing costs to society through deadweight losses for any given 
size of reward for the inventive firm, Klemperer (1990) identifies a case where exactly the 
opposite is the case. Klemperer identifies two sources of social costs: Firstly, consumers who 
substitute to another product class, and secondly consumers who substitute within the 
product class to less preferred products. A wider patent increases the first form of distortion 
by permitting higher prices, which leads consumers to switch to other product classes and 
thus increases deadweight loss, but a wider patent also reduces the possibilities for consumers 
to switch to unpatented, competitively provided varieties of the product thus reducing the 
second form of distortion. Thus he concludes that “..., infinitely lived, narrow patents are 
                                                          
36 This is due to the fact that the cost reduction is not big enough to induce a decrease in prices and an associated 
output increase (Scherer 1972: p. 23). 
37 This is quite contradictory to the conventional argument, which would award longer patent lives to more 
important inventions since they are arguably riskier and probably require higher research investments. However, 
this surprising result of Nordhaus’ model only holds for run-of-the-mill inventions and not in the case of drastic 
inventions (Nordhaus 1967: p. 9). 
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typically desirable when substitution costs between varieties of the product are similar across 
consumers, but very short-lived, wide patents are desirable when valuations of the preferred 
variety relative to not buying the product at all are similar across consumers” (Klemperer 
1990, p. 127). In short, Klemperer’s results indicate how the optimal combination of patent 
length and breadth varies with product classes.  
 
While both Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990) advocate the idea that the 
optimal patent system should include some kind of trade-off between patent length and 
breadth,38 Gallini (1992) produces somewhat contrasting results. This is attributable to the fact 
that Gallini introduces imitation costs to the model. While Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and 
Klemperer (1990) both assume that the imitation cost is zero, Gallini (1992) by introducing 
imitation costs endogenised the imitation decision. Since longer patent terms increase the 
incentives for imitation Gallini finds that if only patent length is considered, it should be short 
in order to discourage imitation. In the case where both patent length and breadth are 
considered however, Gallini (1992) finds that the scope of protection should be broad while 
the length can be adjusted in order to reach the requested level of patent rewards (pp. 52-53).  
 
All three papers are however subject to limitations. In particular, their focus on a single 
independent invention implies that the potential negative effects of a broad patent on the rate 
of invention are not considered. In the case of cumulative research the question of the best 
way to distribute the rewards for inventing between the initial inventor and the follow-on 
inventor arises. An invention can be stimulated by an earlier invention in three different ways. 
The initial invention can spur the development of the second invention, in which case society 
profits by getting the second invention sooner. Alternatively the initial invention can reduce 
the research costs of the second invention in which case society profits by getting the second 
invention cheaper. The initial invention may also make inventions possible that could not 
have been developed otherwise. These externalities are not considered by the initial inventor’s 
research decisions unless they can appropriate some of the returns of the follow-on inventions 
however. The second inventor also needs to be rewarded in order to induce research 
investment in the follow-on invention (Scotchmer, 1991, p. 31).39  
 
                                                          
38 Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) find the optimal patent to be narrow and long, while Klemperer (1990) finds the 
optimal patent to be either narrow and long or broad and short depending on elasticity of demand.  
39 In this setting a third characteristic in addition to patent length and breadth becomes important, namely the height 
of IPR protection. The height of protection determines the novelty requirements and thus together with patent 
breadth determines the level of protection for the initial invention from follow-on inventions (Gallini and Scotchmer, 
2002, p. 66). Regarding the height of protection Scotchmer and Green (1990) argue with some reservations for weak 
novelty requirements.  
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Recent studies by Green and Scotchmer (1995), O’Donoghue (1998) and O’Donoghue et al. 
(1998) are mostly consistent with Kitch’s40 conclusion that strong patent protection should be 
awarded to the initial inventor in the case of cumulative research. Scotchmer (1996) even 
claims that patent protection for follow-on inventions is not necessary at all to induce their 
development if there is no impediment to ex-ante licensing, since this maximises the reward 
for the initial inventor. Several researchers have raised doubts about this support for broad 
patent protection however. Merges and Nelson (1990) as well as Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998) 
expressed their concerns about a broader patent scope with regard to the danger of blocking 
up the entire research field. Mazzoleni and Nelson argue that the risk of this effect is higher 
than most studies anticipate since they do not account for possible high transaction costs for 
licensing agreements (pp. 280-282). Merges and Nelson (1990) argue on the basis of historical 
evidence from the radio, aircraft and pharmaceutical industries that in the case of cumulative 
research broad patents can lead to blockages. Further they conclude that: “[t]here is no 
evidence [...] that firms coordinate the development of a prospect by licensing the cultivation 
of particular applications of a broad technology to particular licensees; indeed, patents were 
often pooled and cross licensed en masse to all firms seeking to enter the field” (pp. 908-909).  
 
3.6. IPRs in the North-South Context 
 
In an open economy where extensive differences in economic development and innovation 
capabilities among countries exist, IPR protection raises further questions. From a static point 
of view in a closed economy granting temporary monopoly rights merely involves a transfer of 
consumer surplus to producers,41 which is if anything a question of distribution. In the case of 
an open economy however and of a technology importing country in particular the monopoly 
rents ( in Figure 1) are awarded to a foreign firm and can thus be considered as a 
static loss for the country. If, in addition, the country is rather small and thus unlikely to 
stimulate the research of foreign firms towards products that better suit the local demand a 
straightforward welfare loss is the consequence (Maskus, 2000, p. 33).  
 
Moreover, losses can arise if the country possesses an imitative industry. This can impose 
further costs for the country through higher unemployment rates and higher prices (Fink and 
Maskus, 2005). In addition, the impact of IPRs on the quantity supplied to the market is not 
clear a-priori. On the one hand, IPR protection strengthens the market position of the 
exporting firm since illegitimate local competitors are driven out of the market which thus 
raises the demand for the protected good. Maskus (2000a) refers to this effect, which leads to 
                                                          
40 Kitch (1977) argues in the case of sequential invention for a broad initial patent in order to prevent over 
investment and wasteful duplication and thus secure orderly development of the follow-on invention. Licensing 
could assure the consideration of other research ideas and capabilities for follow-on invention. 
41 Leaving the deadweight loss aside for a moment, since it will be suffered in any case.  
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an expansion in the quantity of goods exported to the country, as the market-expansion effect. On 
the other hand, the firm might reduce supply since the lower elasticity of demand due to 
increased market power allows the firm to curtail it sales, which Maskus (2000a) refers to as 
the market-power effect (p. 112). Whether the market-power or the market-expansion effect prevails is 
not clear a-priori and likely depends on other characteristics of the economy. Maskus and 
Penubarti (1995) suggest that in small countries with low imitation capabilities the market-power 
effect probably outweighs the market-expansion effect, while for larger countries with strong 
imitative capabilities the opposite is likely to be the case (p.230).  
 
In addition to potential negative effects due to market power, there are potentially positive 
effects which also have to be considered. First, stronger IPR protection can stimulate 
invention and innovation in the developing country itself. This argument is likely to be 
relevant for a small number of relatively advanced developing countries however, who have 
gained substantial experience and technological knowledge in some fields of production at 
least. In all other countries simply raising the levels of IPRs is unlikely to be enough to foster 
innovation (Verspagen, 2003, pp. 503-504). Lerner (2002) for example finds in his study of 
177 patent reforms in 60 countries over the past 150 years that reforms aimed at increasing 
the levels of patent protection had no effect on innovation in developing countries, where 
innovation is measured by patent fillings in the reform country and in Great Britain. (p. 30-
31).42  A second benefit of strong patent protection in developing countries would result if a 
high level of IPRs induces research by firms from developed countries that better suit the 
needs and demand of developing countries. This can be especially important in the case of 
pharmaceutical products (Diwan and Rodrik, 1991, p. 2). Once again however this is likely to 
be of greater relevance for large developing countries with considerable purchasing power.  A 
third benefit of patent protection would arise if in the absence of patent protection innovative 
firms that do not see their intellectual property protected are unwilling to either license their 
knowledge to firms in that country, engage in FDI,  or export to that country. Stronger IPR 
protection may increase any of these three potential channels of technology transfer therefore 
(Verspagen, 2003, p.503). Such a benefit is likely to be of more relevance to developing 
countries, since they may not gain from the stimulation of local innovation due to their limited 
innovation capability. Formal technology transfer is likely to be one of the most promising 
potential positive effects for developing countries from stronger IPRs. The impact of stronger 
IPRs on the market serving decision is not clear from the outset however, since there are 
considerable interacting effects at work.  
 
 
  
                                                          
42  Brandstetter et al. (2004) and Schneider (2005) find no impact of IPRs on innovation for developing 
countries. Chen and Puttitanun (2005) find a positive impact however. 
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4. Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation 
 
The main benefit claimed for strong IPR protection is that by allowing innovators to 
appropriate a share of the benefits of their creative activities, R&D is encouraged which leads 
to innovation and higher long-run growth. In this section we examine the cross-country 
evidence linking IPRs to domestic innovation, with its impact on (long-run) growth discussed 
later. As mentioned above, there is some literature often using survey data that finds IPR 
protection to have only a limited impact on innovation, with studies suggesting that with the 
exception of some industries IPRs are not a particularly effective means of appropriating the 
returns to R&D (see for example, Mansfield, 1986).43 Other studies consider more aggregate 
data to examine the relationship between IPRs and innovation, often looking at the 
relationship between indices of the strength of IPR protection and either R&D spending (a 
measure of the input into innovative activity) or patent applications (a measure of the output 
of innovative activity).44 A selection of results from such studies are summarised in the upper 
part of Table 2, which summarises the literature linking IPR protection to innovation, 
technology diffusion and growth.  
 
At the aggregate level Kanwar and Evenson (2003) examine directly whether stronger IPR 
protection (measured by the Ginarte and Park (1997) index of IPRs, hereafter GPI) results in 
increased R&D expenditure45. They estimate a panel model for up to 32 countries for the 
period 1981-1995, and find that stronger IPR protection has a positive and significant impact 
on the share of R&D investment in GDP. Given that it has been shown elsewhere that R&D 
spending impacts positively upon TFP and output growth (see for example Coe and Helpman, 
1995), these results provide indirect evidence of the importance of IPR protection in growth. 
There are also a small number of econometric studies using data on domestic patent 
applications to examine the role of IPRs in promoting innovation. Many such studies suggest 
that stronger IPR protection results in little or no measured increase in domestic innovation, 
at least as measured by patent applications (Lerner, 2001, 2002; Branstetter et al., 2004).46 
 
                                                          
43 Other studies reaching similar conclusions include Scherer et al. (1959), Taylor and Silberston (1973), Arundel 
and van de Paal (1995) and Cohen et al. (1997). 
44 Both measures have advantages and disadvantages. Data on R&D for instance fails to take into account that 
innovation is risky, so that a significant portion of R&D projects are unsuccessful, and there is the possibility of 
discovering new technology by chance, while there exists substantial variation in the value of patents, with the 
majority worth very little (though more than the cost of patenting), as well as the fact that many innovations are 
not patented. 
45 Note the potential for reverse causality in the relationship between R&D spending and IPR protection. Not 
only may IPR protection stimulate R&D and innovative activities, but we may also expect that the demand for 
IPR protection is stronger in countries that are more innovative. 
46 Whilst finding that domestic innovation does not respond significantly to IPR protection, both Lerner (2001, 
2002) and Branstetter et al (2004) find that foreign patent applications respond to IPR reforms suggesting that one 
benefit of increased IPR protection is through technology transfer. This channel is further discussed below. 
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A recent paper by Chen and Puttitanun (2005) however shows that stronger IPR protection 
has a positive impact upon innovation – as measured by patent applications – in developing 
countries. Chen and Puttitanun develop a model that has both an import and a local sector, 
with a local and a foreign firm in the import sector and two local firms in the local sector. In 
the import sector the foreign firm has a patented technology, while one of the local firms has 
the ability to develop patentable technology in the local sector. Stronger IPR protection by 
reducing the ability to imitate can lead to lower competition and higher prices in the import 
sector, but may encourage innovation in the local sector. The theoretical model suggests that 
domestic innovation in a country increases in its protection of IPRs and its level of 
development, and that a country’s level of IPR protection may at first increase and then 
decrease in its level of development. The model is tested empirically on a sample of 64 
developing countries using panel data over the period 1975-2000. The empirical model is a 
system of two equations, one for IPRs and one for innovation. IPRs are measured using the 
GPI index, while innovation is measured using patent applications filed at the US patent office 
by developing country residents. Empirical results confirm the U-shaped relationship between 
IPRs and a country’s level of development and that stronger IPR protection encourages 
innovation. Including interaction terms between IPRs and the level of development suggest 
that IPR protection has a stronger impact on innovation in countries with higher levels of 
development.  
 
In a related paper, Schneider (2005) examines the importance of IPR protection, high-tech 
imports and FDI on innovation and on per capita GDP growth. Once again innovation is 
measured using the number of US patent applications made by residents of a given country. 
The model is estimated on panel data for 47 developed and developing countries over the 
period 1970-1990. The results again suggest that innovation responds positively to IPR 
protection. Splitting the sample into developed and developing countries, Schneider finds that 
while IPRs have a positive impact on innovation in developed countries, the impact in 
developing countries is negative, and often significant. 
 
5. Technology Diffusion and Intellectual Property Rights 
 
Technology may be transferred through a number of formal and informal channels with 
Trade, FDI and licensing being potentially some of the most important.47 As we saw above, 
the impact of stronger IPR protection on technology diffusion is ambiguous in theory and will 
depend on a country’s circumstances. On the one hand, stronger IPR protection can restrict 
the diffusion of technology with patents preventing others from using proprietary knowledge 
                                                          
47  Other potential channels of international technology transfer include: joint ventures, cross-border movement 
of skilled workers, test data and patent applications, and temporary migration of scientists, students and 
managerial personnel (Maskus 2004: pp. 9-13). 
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and the increased market power of IPR holders potentially reducing the dissemination of 
knowledge due to lower output and higher prices. On the other hand, IPRs can play a positive 
role in knowledge diffusion, since the information available in patent claims is available to 
other potential inventors. Moreover, strong IPR protection may encourage technology 
transfer through increased trade, FDI, technology licensing and joint ventures. Despite this 
theoretical ambiguity, the diffusion of technology from countries at the technological frontier 
is considered to be one of the main potential benefits of the TRIPS Agreement, particularly 
for developing countries that tend not to innovate significantly.  
 
Most studies considering the impact of IPRs on technology diffusion tend to take one of the 
channels through which technology might be diffused and to examine whether IPRs impacts 
upon the volume of activity in this channel. If it does, then it is inferred that IPR protection 
affects technology flows (via a specific channel). This literature is reviewed below, the general 
conclusions of which are summarised in the lower part of Table 2. 
  
 
5.1 Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade 
 
The available evidence suggests that trade is an important channel for technology diffusion 
(see for example Keller, 2004), the question that remains is to what extent are trade flows 
influenced by IPRs. Maskus (2000a) discusses the problems faced in trying to identify the 
effects of IPR protection on international trade. Firstly, the effects of patent strength are 
partly embedded in the prices at which goods are traded, and these effects cannot be separated 
from other components of pricing behaviour. Secondly, the decision to export may be but one 
of the options available. The effects of stronger IPRs on exports will also depend on whether 
FDI and licensing are viable alternatives and how stronger IPRs affect the choice among them 
(Ferrantino, 1993). Thirdly, IPR protection creates market power in the distribution and sale 
of new goods and technologies, implying that market structure also matters. 
 
As outlined above, stronger IPRs can, depending on whether the market-expansion or the 
market-power effect prevails and whether the firm chooses to substitute trade by FDI or 
licensing, expand or reduce trade flows. Maskus and Penubarti (1995) argue that of the two 
countervailing effects, the ‘market expansion’ effect is likely to dominate in larger countries 
with strong imitative abilities, while the ‘market power’ effect would dominate in smaller 
countries with weak imitative abilities. As Maskus (2000a) notes however, the ‘market power’ 
and ‘market size’ effects may be moderated by other circumstances. Weak IPR protection 
need not remove an innovative firm’s market power since imitation in the local market is likely 
to be costly and take time. Similarly strong IPR protection need not create a monopoly 
because legitimate substitutes are likely to be available in the domestic economy. Taylor (1993) 
argues that a third factor may be important for larger markets with significant imitative 
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abilities at least, with stronger IPR protection encouraging exports by reducing the need for 
firms to try and deter local imitation, thus reducing costs for exporting firms. This discussion 
suggests that the impact of IPR protection on trade is likely to depend importantly upon the 
level of development and upon the imitative ability of the importing country. In countries 
with little capacity to imitate advanced goods, stronger IPR protection may lead to market 
power effects, whereas in countries with the ability to imitate advanced goods strong IPR 
protection may be important for exporters in advanced countries, with such protection 
reducing the risk of imitation and encouraging trade.  
 
Given the theoretical ambiguity of the IPR-Trade relationship, a number of studies have 
examined the question empirically. Maskus and Penubarti (1995) use an augmented version of 
the Helpman-Krugman model of monopolistic competition to estimate the effects of patent 
protection on 1984 bilateral trade for 28 manufacturing sectors. They examined trade from 22 
OECD countries to a sample of 71 countries at all stages of development. Their explanatory 
variables include the importing country’s per capita Gross National Product (GNP) and trade 
restrictions (BMP and tariff revenue as a percentage of dutiable imports) alongside an index of 
IPR protection developed by Rapp and Rozek (1990) (RRI hereafter). They also include the 
interaction between the IPR index and dummies indicating whether the importing developing 
country has a small or a large market to account for market size effects and technological 
capacity. Their results indicate that higher levels of IPR protection have a positive impact on 
bilateral manufacturing imports into both small and large developing economies, though the 
impacts were statistically weaker in the smaller economies. Whilst suggestive of the 
importance of technological capacity or imitative ability for the relationship between IPR 
protection and trade, their results find little support for a positive impact of IPR protection in 
the most patent sensitive industries. 
 
Adding a measure of IPR protection to a standard equation explaining trade flows is a clear 
first step to determine if this channel is important for technology diffusion. Fink and 
Primo Braga (2005) add the GPI measure of IPR protection to a standard gravity equation48 
explaining either total non-fuel or high-tech trade flows for a large cross-section of countries 
for the year 1989. The rationale for using high-tech trade in addition to total non-fuel trade is 
based on the a priori expectation that the effects of IPR protection are stronger for knowledge-
intensive trade. To deal with the econometric problem of zero trade flows, their model 
consists of one equation explaining the probability of zero observations and a second equation 
explaining the magnitude of positive trade flows. They find that stronger IPR protection has a 
small but significantly positive impact on the probability that countries trade with each other 
and a significantly positive impact on bilateral trade flows for both total non-fuel imports and 
                                                          
48 Including the GDP and populations of both trade partners, distance between trade partners and dummies for 
common border, common language and various Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTAs) as standard 
explanatory variables. 
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exports. For high-tech trade however, stronger IPR protection is found to have a significantly 
negative impact on the probability that two countries trade with one another and a negative 
and insignificant impact on bilateral trade flows. This latter result is contrary to what one 
might have expected, and Fink and Primo Braga suggest several possible explanations, based 
on the considerations noted above. Firstly, strong market power effects in the case of high 
technology goods may offset positive market expansion effects caused by stronger IPR 
protection. Secondly, stronger IPR regimes may cause high-tech firms to serve foreign 
markets by FDI, partly substituting for trade. Thirdly, the high-tech aggregate may include 
many goods that are not sensitive to the destination country’s patent regime, as other means 
of appropriating the benefits of the investment in R&D may be more important. Fourthly, 
they were unable to include tariff and non-tariff barriers, which may be important 
determinants of trade flows for some industries. 
 
In a similar gravity equation exercise, Smith (1999) examines the impact of IPR protection on 
exports from the 50 US states plus the District of Colombia to 96 countries. Smith splits her 
sample of importing countries into four groups depending on their imitative ability defined 
according to their strength of patent rights49 and R&D spending as a percentage of GNP50. 
Dummies for these four groups were then interacted with the IPR measure. She finds a 
negative relationship between IPR protection and exports from the US to those countries with 
the weakest threat of imitation. For those countries with the strongest threat of imitation 
however a positive relationship between IPR protection and trade exists. Overall, she 
concludes that US exports depend upon IPR protection in importing countries, but that the 
direction of the relationship depends on the threat of imitation. Weak IPRs are a barrier to US 
exports, but only for countries that pose a strong threat of imitation.  
 
Falvey et al (2009) consider the impact of the strength of IPRs in a sample of 69 countries on 
imports from the five countries conducting the vast majority of the world’s innovation (i.e. 
France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S.). After confirming a positive impact of IPRs on 
imports the authors use threshold regression methods to examine whether a country’s 
imitative ability and market size impact upon the relationship between IPRs and imports. The 
results indicate that the impact of IPRs on imports is increasing in both imitative ability and 
market size. Unlike Smith (1999) there is little evidence supporting market power effects. 
                                                          
49 Both the Rapp and Rozek and the Ginarte and Park indices are used with similar outcomes. 
50 The four groups are defined (in increasing order of imitative ability) as: 1. Countries with weak imitative 
abilities and strong IPR protection: 2. Poor countries that have low technological capabilities and thus a low 
threat of imitation, but that also have low levels of IPR protection: 3. Industrial countries that tend to have 
strong technological capabilities leading to a strong imitation threat, but that at the same time tend to have high 
IPR protection, which dampens this threat, and: 4. Industrialising countries that have an effective threat of 
imitation and that also have low levels of IPR protection. Maskus (2000a) suggests caution is warranted in 
interpreting Smith’s results since, “in the developing economies R&D data are highly suspect and not comparable 
to those in developed countries” (p. 118). In addition, the division of countries into four groups is somewhat 
subjective, with a number of anomalous designations. 
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Recently, studies have considered how trade is affected by IPRs. Foster (2011) for example 
examines whether IPRs impact upon trade by changing the volume of products traded (i.e. the 
intensive margin) or by changing the variety of products traded (i.e. the extensive margin). The 
results indicate that stronger IPRs have a positive impact upon imports, and that this effect 
works mainly along the extensive margin. For the intensive margin market power effects are 
often found. The results thus indicate that stronger IPRs can enhance trade by increasing the 
variety of products traded, but that firms may act monopolistically in countries with stronger 
IPRs by reducing the volume of goods traded. Ivus (2011) conducts a similar exercise using 
data on U.S. exports and again finds that stronger IPRs in developing countries have impacted 
positively upon imports from the U.S. and that this effect has occurred largely along the 
extensive margin.  
 
The results of these studies suggest that stronger IPR protection can lead to significantly 
higher trade flows, though not necessarily in goods and industries considered high-tech or 
patent sensitive. Fink and Maskus (2005) draw the following conclusions from this empirical 
literature. Firstly, they argue that transnational trading firms do not base their export decisions 
on IPRs in the poorest countries, where the local threats of imitation and reverse engineering 
are weakest. Secondly, patent rights matter importantly in middle-income, large developing 
countries, where such imitation is more likely. Stronger IPR protection in these countries 
encourages foreign firms to expand their trade volumes by reducing the threat of imitation. 
Thirdly, the products of many high-tech industries are difficult to imitate, so trade flows in 
these industries are in fact less sensitive to IPR protection than in other medium-technology 
industries51. Fourthly, high-tech firms may decide to serve foreign markets through FDI and 
licensing, so that exports in such industries may be little affected by variations in the degree of 
IPR protection. Moreover, while stronger IPR protection may increase imports of high-tech 
goods, it also increases imports of low-tech consumer goods and may lead to the decline of 
indigenous industries relying on imitation. 
 
Despite these conclusions ambiguity remains over how these increased trade flows affect 
welfare in the South. The general explanation for the welfare enhancing properties of 
international trade is related to a more efficient division of labour and enhanced competition. 
Stronger IPRs however impede competition and may shift production to the North, which 
may face higher production costs than the South52. On the other hand, if an insufficient level 
                                                          
51 Cohen (1995) argues that in many high-tech industries, such as aerospace and robotics, the complexity of the 
technology makes imitation via reverse engineering extremely difficult, rendering IPR protection unnecessary. 
52 For example the decision of Pfizer not to serve the Indian market with a  new drug because there are already 
generic equivalents on the market is one example where the lower trade flows cannot be per se associated with a 
welfare loss for the Indian consumer. (Under the assumption that the generic product has about the same quality 
as the brand name product.)   
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of protection impedes the import of products that cannot be imitated, and thus no equivalent 
substitutes exist, national welfare is negatively affected. This is probably most important in the 
case of high-technology goods and capital goods, despite empirical studies tending not to find 
a significant effect of IPRs for these products. 
 
5.2. Intellectual Property Rights and FDI 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) occurs when a Multinational Corporation (MNC) has a 
sufficient cost or technological advantage over firms in the host country to offset the higher 
costs of operating internationally. FDI can be vertical, in which case the subsidiary produces 
inputs or undertakes assembly from components that are likely exported within the MNC, or 
horizontal, in which case the subsidiary produces products and services similar to those 
produced by the parent firm. Increasingly, FDI is undertaken in industries in which 
knowledge and technology are important. This is because technology advantages can be 
transferred relatively easily across borders, and because technology acts as a public good 
within the firm, where it can be employed in several locations without reducing its availability 
for others. The decision on where to invest will depend on locational considerations that 
include local market size, resource availability, distance from markets and production costs. 
Where technology is relevant to the FDI decision an adequate supply of labour with the 
appropriate skills will also be important. 
 
While FDI can be an important channel for technology diffusion when firm-specific 
technology is transferred across borders, one important advantage of FDI relative to licensing 
or joint ventures from the TNC’s perspective is that FDI keeps the technology internal to the 
firm. This may limit the diffusion of technology within the host country. Even so a number of 
considerations suggest that the presence of TNCs in a country will provide spillover benefits 
to domestic firms53. Fosfuri, Motta and Ronde (2001) for example argue that such benefits 
may appear through labour training and turnover, while Rodriguez-Clare (1996) suggests that 
the provision of high-quality intermediate inputs may provide an important externality when 
they also become available to domestic firms. Imitation through reverse engineering may also 
be facilitated when the product is produced locally (Das, 1987). Domestic firms may find it 
easier to export once foreign TNCs establish distribution networks, a transport infrastructure 
and satisfy the relevant regulatory arrangements (Aitken, Hanson and Harrison, 1997). 
 
Empirical evidence linking FDI to technology diffusion is mixed. In general, there is little 
evidence of substantial FDI spillovers for developed or developing countries.54 Xu and Wang 
(2000) extend the approach of Coe and Helpman (1995) for a sample of up to 21 OECD 
countries over the period 1971-1990, by adding both inward and outward FDI flows as 
                                                          
53 See Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) and Saggi (2002) for a detailed discussion of the potential benefits of FDI. 
54 See the review by Görg and Greenaway (2004). 
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weights on foreign knowledge stocks. They find little evidence of spillovers through inward 
FDI, but some evidence of spillovers through outward FDI. Globermann, Kokko and 
Sjöholm (2000) using data on patent applications by Swedish TNCs and non-TNCs also find 
evidence that outward FDI is the more important source of technology transfer. An 
alternative approach has been to consider patent citations as an indicator of the extent of 
spillovers. Using data on Japanese FDI into the United States, Branstetter (2001) finds 
evidence that FDI encourages technology spillovers through subsidiaries bringing technology 
from their countries of origin and through TNCs facilitating learning of foreign technologies. 
 
Görg and Greenaway (2004) summarize the results from several studies of FDI spillovers at 
the firm or industry level. Here firm or industry productivity is regressed on control variables 
plus a variable which proxies the presence of foreign firms in the sector, usually the share of 
employment in TNCs or the share of total sales by TNCs. The results are mixed with positive, 
negative and insignificant impacts of foreign investment all being found. One explanation put 
forward for the negative impact is that increased competition in product and factor markets 
can have a negative impact on a domestic firm’s productivity (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). 
Görg and Greenaway do note that there is some evidence of spillovers for firms that have a 
certain level of absorptive capacity. 
 
Like the other channels, economic theory is unable to draw unambiguous conclusions on the 
impact of IPRs on FDI. TNCs are more likely to undertake FDI rather than licensing or joint 
ventures when they have a complex technology and highly differentiated products and when 
the costs of transferring technology through licensing are high (Davidson and McFetridge, 
1984; Teece, 1986; Horstmann and Markusen, 1987). In such circumstances stronger IPRs, by 
reducing the risks of technology leakage through “arms-length” trade, may increase the extent 
of licensing and joint ventures, thus reducing the need for FDI (Yang and Maskus, 2001a). On 
the other hand, it has been argued that weak IPR protection tends to affect the general 
investment climate adversely, hence discouraging FDI (Smith, 2001). The importance of IPR 
protection is also likely to vary across sectors, being of secondary importance for FDI in low-
tech industries, or where the product or technology is difficult to imitate. For TNCs with 
technology that is easy to copy however we would expect more attention to be paid to the 
strength of IPR protection. Regardless of these arguments it is clear that strong IPR 
protection is not a necessary condition for firms to invest in particular countries. If it were, 
then large countries with high growth rates but weak IPR regimes, such as Brazil and China, 
would not have received the large foreign investment inflows that they have. While flows of 
FDI into these countries have been large, some evidence indicates that TNCs are unwilling to 
locate R&D facilities in such countries and that they may transfer older technology (see for 
example Maskus et al., 2005). 
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The empirical evidence linking IPR protection to inward FDI is mixed. Mansfield (1994) used 
survey evidence for 100 major US firms in six industries, and asked whether IPR protection 
was a concern in the location of various facilities. He found that while IPR protection was of 
little concern in the location of sales and distribution outlets, it became more important at 
higher stages of production. Many firms were concerned about IPR protection when deciding 
on the location of components manufactures, while the majority were concerned about IPR 
protection in the location of complete product manufactures. The greatest concern about IPR 
protection was in deciding the location of R&D facilities, which were less likely to be located 
in countries with weak IPR protection55. Across industries IPR protection was found to be 
very important for chemicals and pharmaceuticals, but was of secondary importance in other 
industries. This it has been argued is because FDI in many low-tech goods is likely to depend 
more on input costs and market opportunities, rather than IPR protection (Maskus, 2000d). 
IPRs are also likely to be of secondary importance for FDI in products that are difficult to 
imitate. 
 
The early econometric research found little evidence of links between IPR protection and the 
volume of FDI. Ferrantino (1993) found no statistically significant relationship between a 
country’s membership of international patent or copyright conventions (or the length of its 
patent grant) and the extent of US affiliate sales in that country; Mansfield (1993) found that 
there was no significant correlation between the extent of FDI by US firms in a country and 
the perceived strength of its intellectual property protection; and Maskus and Eby-Konan 
(1994) found an insignificant impact of the RRI on FDI by US TNCs. More recently, Primo 
Braga and Fink (1998) found no evidence of a relationship between either FDI flows or stocks 
and the GPI in a gravity model of FDI. But Maskus (2000b) cautions that these studies should 
be discounted somewhat, since they were “limited in specification and plagued by poor 
measurement” (p. 10).  
 
There is stronger evidence that the strength of IPRs affects the type of activities TNCs are 
willing to conduct in host countries. Lee and Mansfield (1996) consider the relationship 
between a country’s protection of IPR and the volume and composition of US FDI in that 
country. Using the same survey of 100 US firms as Mansfield (1994) they explain the volume 
of US FDI into each of 14 countries using control variables and a variable which measures the 
average percentage of firms who considered patent protection in this country to be too weak 
to either transfer their newest technology to a wholly owned subsidiary there or to invest in a 
joint venture with a local partner. The results suggest that FDI is lower in countries with 
weaker perceived IPR protection, and that the percentage of FDI that was devoted to final 
production and to R&D facilities was significantly lower in countries with perceived weak IPR 
protection, suggesting that not only the volume but also the quality of investment is affected 
                                                          
55 Mansfield (1995) conducted a similar exercise for German and Japanese firms, reaching similar conclusions. 
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by the strength of IPR protection. Kumar (2002) argues that these results should be treated 
with caution due to the small sample size, the subjective measure of IPR protection and the 
low t-values on coefficients. He goes on however to discuss evidence by Seyoum (1996) who 
found that IPR protection is significant in explaining inward FDI, particularly in emerging 
markets and Maskus (1998b) who found that the strength of IPR protection was positively 
related to affiliate sales and assets in developing countries. 
 
The question of whether the strength of local IPRs is important for the location of overseas 
R&D activity of TNCs is taken up by Kumar (2001). Economies of scale in innovation, 
agglomeration economies and the need to protect firm-specific technology all discourage 
undertaking R&D abroad. But this may be partly countered by the need to adapt goods to 
local market conditions, to take advantage of cheap inputs, and to benefit from trained R&D 
personnel and localised knowledge. While investment in R&D overseas is the least globalised 
of TNCs activities, Kumar shows that it has grown over time, especially since the 1980s. He 
then relates the ratio of R&D expenditure to affiliate sales by US and Japanese TNCs to 
control variables and the GPI in a sample of up to 77 countries, but finds that R&D spending 
overseas is not affected by the strength of IPR protection in the destination country. 
 
Smarzynska (2004) examines whether stronger IPR protection affects the composition of FDI 
flows for 24 transition economies. She estimates a Probit model of the decision to invest in a 
country and in the decision to invest in production facilities abroad. She finds that weak IPR 
regimes deter FDI in high-tech sectors (i.e. drugs, cosmetics and health care products, 
chemicals, machinery and equipment and electrical equipment) with some evidence suggesting 
that FDI is deterred in other industries also.  She also finds evidence to suggest that stronger 
IPR protection encourages firms to set up local production facilities rather than focusing 
solely on distribution networks, with this latter effect not restricted to high-tech sectors. 
 
Branstetter et al (2004) use affiliate level data on US TNCs and aggregate patent data to test 
whether legal reforms that strengthen IPRs increase the transfer of technology by TNCs to 
reforming countries. The results suggest that technology transfer is higher following IPR 
reforms, with an increase in technology transfer, as measured by intra-firm royalty payments 
from parent firms to affiliates located in IPR reforming countries. They also distinguish 
affiliates between those whose parent companies patent in the US above and below the 
median. They find that technology transfer is concentrated among affiliates of parents that use 
patents extensively (i.e. those that patent above the median). 
 
In conclusion, while there are many reasons to expect inward FDI to be an important channel 
for technology diffusion, the evidence of this to date at both the aggregate and firm level is 
mixed. If anything at all, the evidence indicates that FDI is an important source of diffusion in 
countries that have reached a certain level of absorptive capacity. To the extent that FDI is an 
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important source of diffusion, IPR protection can affect the extent of technology diffusion 
through its impact on FDI flows. Again however, the evidence linking IPRs to FDI is mixed. 
Stronger IPR protection has been found to encourage FDI in certain industries, most notably 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals. As with trade, IPRs may play less of a role in high-tech 
industries due to the difficulty in imitating these industries products, while in low-tech 
industries other factors may be more important in determining FDI flows. Stronger IPR 
protection has also been found to affect FDI flows at certain production stages. In particular, 
IPRs can affect FDI flows in component manufactures, final production and R&D facilities, 
reflecting the fact that patenting is more important at some stages of production than at 
others. 
 
5.3. Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing 
 
The role of licensing as a means of technology diffusion is complex. Licensing is not a simple 
transaction and difficult to characterise. Licensing transactions range from turnkey projects to 
technical assistance, codified knowledge and IPRs. Furthermore they can differ regarding the 
rights transferred (e.g. distribution rights, production rights, and limits regarding the time and 
geographical territory the rights are granted for), the compensation mode (e.g. fixed fees, share 
of profits, franchise fees) and other specifications (e.g. provisions for performance 
requirements, “no-compete” clauses, non-disclosure mandates and grant-back provisions for 
adaptations). While licensing can be an important device for technology transfer, successful 
technology transfer again very likely depends on the host countries technological capacities 
(Maskus 2004: p. 20). 
 
Economic theory suggests that firms that own a complex technology, produce highly 
differentiated products and face high licensing costs are more likely to undertake FDI than 
licensing (Horstmann and Markusen, 1987). FDI is more efficient in these circumstances as it 
allows the costs of technology transfer to be internalised. The reasons that technology and 
product licensing should be particularly sensitive to IPR protection are evident however. 
Stronger IPRs should reduce the costs of licensing by reducing the licensor’s expense of 
deterring defection from contracts. They should expand security over the protection of 
proprietary information in licensing deals. Stronger IPR protection gives the licensor greater 
ability to set and monitor terms under which licensees operate. A stronger IPR regime is also 
likely to increase the rents accruing to the licensor, since it does not need to offer the licensee 
a higher share of the rents to deter imitation. At the same time stronger IPR protection 
provides the licensor with greater monopoly power, which as discussed above can reduce 
innovation, which in turn may lead to reduced licensing. 
 
 40
Little empirical literature on licensing and on the importance of IPRs exists. Contractor (1980) 
carried out one of the first studies on this subject. His study, which covers 102 technology 
licenses, mainly focuses on the level and composition of compensations however. Regarding 
patent protection, he shows that licensing returns are higher for patented technology. 
Mansfield (1994) in his study of IPR protection and FDI found that US TNCs were less likely 
to transfer advanced technologies to unaffiliated firms in countries with weak patent rights. 
More recently, Yang and Maskus (2005) estimate the impact of international variations in IPR 
protection on the volume of unaffiliated royalties and licensing fees (a measure of arms-length 
technology transfer) paid to US firms in a panel of 23 largely developed countries in 1985, 
1990 and 1995. Included alongside the GPI (and its square) are measures of human capital 
(representing imitative ability), real GDP, the labour force and a measure of openness. The 
results often indicate a non-linear relationship between licensing and IPR protection, with 
stronger IPR protection reducing licensing at low levels and increasing licensing at higher 
levels. This it is argued is because countries with the lowest levels of IPR protection also have 
the weakest imitative ability. As such an increase in IPR strength in these countries, while 
reducing the risk of imitation slightly, would also increase the monopoly power of the 
licensor. This latter effect is likely to dominate and lead to lower licensing. Most observations 
in the sample however are above the turning point, suggesting that IPR protection has a 
positive impact upon licensing. 
 
Anand and Khanna (2000) investigate the structure of licensing agreements (e.g. prevalence of 
cross-licensing and exclusive licensing, the decision between ex-ante and ex- post technology 
transfer as well as between related and unrelated parties) for a number of different industries 
(chemicals, industrial and commercial machinery, and electronic and electrical equipment and 
components56). The study finds substantial differences in licensing structure between 
industries. Anand and Khanna assume that IPRs are defined not only by policy choice but also 
by bounded rationality. Patent protection is considered strong in the case of chemicals since it 
is relatively easy to precisely describe chemical inventions and inventing around an existing 
patent is difficult in the chemical industry,57 while making such a verbal exhaustive description 
of an innovation in the electronics industry is much more difficult (e.g. a circuit layout). In this 
latter case there is substantial room left for inventing around a patent and reverse engineering. 
Consequently, patent protection is stronger in the chemical industry than in the others. Their 
study finds that the structural differences in licensing patterns of industries can be explained 
by these variations in IP protection.  
 
Fosfuri (2003) focuses in his paper on the effects of country risk on international technology 
flows in the chemical industry. In contrast to the other studies reviewed here, Fosfuri does not 
                                                          
56 These industries will from now on be referred to as chemicals, computers and electronics, respectively.  
57  This is only the case if product protection is available. If only the process can be protected, inventing around 
is considerable less challenging.  
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find a statistically significant impact of IPRs on licensing, neither regarding the volume of 
licensing nor the serving decision58. Fosfuri argues that firms might react to lower protection 
levels by transferring older technology, though this cannot be tested in his data. Park and 
Lippoldt (2005) propose another explanation for Fosfuri’s findings. They point out that 
process innovations, which make up the main part of innovations for the firms included in the 
sample, are better protected by other mechanisms than patent protection (p.15).  
 
Park and Lippoldt (2005) use firm level data to investigate the relationship between IPRs and 
licensing receipts and between the volume of licensing and IPR strength. As control variables, 
country risk, corruption and the mean tariff rate are included. The empirical findings support 
the proposition that stronger IPR protection positively affects international licensing. In 
particular, the study finds that stronger IPRs increase licensing flows for industrial processes, 
pre-recorded performances, and software. Furthermore the industry groups electrical and 
electronics, transportation, finance, and services are positively affected by IPRs, while for the 
food and kindred, chemicals, metals, machinery and wholesale industries no significant impact 
is found. The study further finds that IPRs positively influences licensing in both rich and 
poor countries, with the effect being economically more important in relatively richer 
countries. Park and Lippoldt (2005) also explore whether IPRs influence the serving decision 
by using the ratio of unaffiliated licensing to trade or FDI as dependent variables. They find 
that when IPRs increase, licensing is favoured over trade in poorer countries while it is 
insignificant in richer countries. In the case of licensing compared to FDI, licensing is 
favoured in both income groups. Theoretical considerations also suggest that licensing is 
favoured over the other channels of technology transfer when IPRs are stronger (p. 29-30).  
 
5.4. Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Patenting 
 
A further formal channel of international technology diffusion that is relevant is the patenting 
of innovations in a country by non-residents. When applying for a patent the innovator must 
submit a written description of the innovation, which is then available for all to see. As such, 
non-resident patent applications provide domestic residents with details of foreign technology, 
which can then be used in further domestic innovative activities (to the extent that domestic 
innovative activity doesn’t infringe upon the patent at least). This channel shouldn’t be seen in 
isolation to the channels discussed above however: if the innovating non-resident firm was 
not going to supply a particular market through trade, FDI or licensing then it would have 
little incentive to patent its technology there. Eaton and Kortum (1996) argue that the 
decision to serve a market will be driven largely by market size. They further argue that firms 
would find it unnecessary to patent an innovation in a foreign market with little imitative 
ability, since the risk of their innovation being imitated would be small. As such, firms would 
                                                          
58 Fosfuri (2003) only distinguishes between technological transfer that includes the transfer of production  since 
the data set does not include export data (p.5). 
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find it most necessary to patent their inventions in countries with large markets and with 
relatively high levels of imitative ability. To test this Eaton and Kortum (1996) include the RRI 
measure of IPR protection in their regression explaining the decision to patent abroad in 
OECD countries. They find that countries providing stronger IPR protection are more 
attractive destinations for foreign patents. They further show that productivity growth was 
significantly related to foreign patents, and that except for the major innovators (France, 
Germany, Japan, UK and the USA), countries in the sample obtained over 90 percent of their 
productivity growth from foreign patenting.  
 
Other studies also consider developing countries. Park (1999) conducts a similar exercise to 
that above relating the decision to patent inventions abroad for 16 source countries and 40 
destination countries for four periods between 1975 and 1990. He regresses the fraction of 
inventions in each source country that are patented in each destination on the market size of 
the destination (i.e. GDP per capita), the number of scientists and engineers per 10000 of the 
workforce, the cost of filing patents and the GPI. The results indicate a strong positive impact 
of IPR protection on the decision to patent, suggesting that a 1 percent increase in IPR 
protection leads to a greater than 1 percent increase in the rate of foreign patenting.  
 
Xu and Chiang (2005) consider three channels of technology diffusion. These are: 
international trade (following the approach of Coe and Helpman, 1995); foreign patenting 
(following Eaton and Kortum, 1996); and disembodied spillovers (following the approach of 
Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994). Using data over the period 1980-2000, they split their sample of 
48 countries into developed and developing countries and also into three groups based on real 
GDP per capita (low, middle and high-income countries). They show that, with few 
exceptions, TFP growth is positively and significantly related to all three channels of 
technology diffusion. They go on to examine the determinants of the patenting decision, 
finding that the level of IPR protection is positively and significantly related to foreign 
patenting across country groupings, suggesting that strengthening IPR protection may have a 
positive indirect upon TFP growth by increasing foreign patent applications. 
 
5.5. Multiple Channels of Diffusion 
 
While valuable and informative, the accumulation of studies of individual channels of 
technology diffusion is unlikely to provide full information on the effects of increased IPR 
protection on international technology transfer for several reasons. Firstly, the decisions to 
export, undertake FDI or license are made jointly, implying that studies considering a single 
channel may produce biased results. Secondly, there are some channels that are very difficult 
to measure - imitation and reverse engineering for example – and, consequently, analysis of 
the impact of these channels does not exist. Thirdly, as noted above, there are likely to be 
interactions between direct channels and indirect channels, such as imitation. In view of these 
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considerations, some authors have looked either at multiple channels simultaneously or 
attempted to model the overall costs and benefits of stronger IPR protection.  
 
It is reasonable to assume that the entry mode a firm chooses (licensing, FDI, or exports) is 
influenced by the level of IPRs. The Ownership-Location-Internalisation (OLI) framework 
from Dunning (1981) is a valuable approach to illustrate the simultaneousness of the serving 
decision facing the firm. It distinguishes three possible aspects that influence a firm’s serving 
decision, ownership, location, and internalisation advantages. For example a firm can have 
ownership advantages due to intangible assets it holds. It can exploit location advantages by 
shifting production to a location with lower labour costs while the question of internalisation 
refers to whether or not to produce within or outside the firm. Thus in the context of IPRs 
ownership advantages (e.g. intellectual property that is protected) can, depending on the 
respective strength of market-power and market-expansion effect, increase or decrease 
“bilateral exchange”59 in general.  Regarding the location decision, strong IPRs in a country 
can constitute a location advantage and thus increase local production (FDI and licensing) 
relative to exports. And finally since internalisation is preferred when the threat of imitation is 
very high, internalisation favours exports and FDI (Smith, 2001: pp. 414-418). Thus, apart 
from a fairly strong theoretical case for a positive influence of IPRs on licensing, no 
conclusion can be drawn about the net effect of higher levels of IPRs on the serving decision 
from these considerations.  
 
Other aspects that can influence the serving decision in conjunction with IPRs have been put 
forward in the literature. Fosfuri (2000) finds that the decision on the entry mode not only 
depends on the level of IPRs but also on the vintage of the technology to be transferred. 
Maskus et al. (2005) find that the effect of stronger IPRs depends on whether the decrease in 
contracting cost or the decrease in imitation threat prevails. In the first case licensing increases 
relative to FDI, while the second case is more ambiguous. At a high rate of global innovation 
an increase in IPRs yields the same results as in the first case, but with a low global innovation 
rate FDI is likely to increase relative to licensing. Consequently the effect of stronger IPRs is 
in this case affected by the rate of innovation in the respective industry.  
 
There are a limited number of empirical studies which take account of the simultaneity of the 
serving decision. Ferrentino (1993) uses a gravity model estimated by SUR for sales by foreign 
affiliates, intra-firm exports and arm’s length exports. The level of IPRs is simply measured by 
membership in international IP conventions (Paris, Berne and UPOV) and the duration of 
protection. The study does not find an effect of adherence to IPR agreements regarding U.S. 
exports or foreign production. Transfer exports60 however, are higher under a weak IPR 
                                                          
59 The term “bilateral exchange” is used to refer to all three serving decisions (trade, FDI and licensing) (See 
Smith, 2001). 
60 U.S. exports from the parent firm to a foreign affiliate. 
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regime. Unsurprisingly, under a weak IPR regime U.S. parent firms are less willing to transfer 
production processes to the foreign affiliate and thus export more to these affiliates.  
 
Fink (2005), who investigates the effect of different levels of IPRs on U.S. and German 
foreign production, exporting and licensing behaviour also finds only weak evidence for an 
impact of IPRs on these channels of technology transfer. His approach is similar to 
Ferrentino’s, but improves on it by using a more precise IPR measure (the GPI) and takes 
account of the possibility that data availability may affect the randomness of the sample. His 
findings for the U.S. indicate that there is no or at best a weak negative impact of IPRs, while 
for Germany exports as well as receipts for processes, inventions and patents are positively 
influenced by IPRs. This last finding however does not indicate whether this is due to an 
increase in technology transferred or a consequence of the stronger bargaining power of 
German firms due to stronger IPRs.  
 
Maskus (1998b) considered the joint decision of TNCs, examining the impact of patent rights 
on patent applications, affiliate sales, exports and affiliate assets using a four equation 
simultaneous equation model. The model was estimated with data on the foreign operations 
of US majority-owned manufacturing affiliates in 46 destination countries over the period 
1989-1992. As independent variables Maskus included the RRI, distance from the US, 
investment incentives, market size, tariff protection and the level of local R&D. Also included 
was the interaction between the IPR index and a dummy for developing countries. The results 
suggest that patent applications are strongly affected by IPR protection, though less so in 
developing countries. Stronger IPRs also impact positively upon exports, affiliate assets and 
affiliate sales in developing countries. 
 
In a similar vein, Smith (2001) considers the simultaneous impact of IPR protection on US 
exports, affiliate sales and licenses to unaffiliated foreign firms in a sample of 50 developed 
and developing countries using a variant of the gravity equation. As in her previous study, the 
IPR variable is interacted with dummies for weak and strong imitative ability. The results 
suggest that stronger IPRs increase bilateral exchange across all countries. At the same time, 
stronger IPRs increase the benefits of locating abroad and lead to increases in affiliate sales 
and licensing relative to exports, particularly in countries with strong imitative abilities. Strong 
IPRs also reduce the need to internalise knowledge assets within the firm thus increasing US 
licenses relative to both affiliate sales and exports. The evidence in favour of stronger IPRs 
increasing US exports is weak once multiple channels of exchange are allowed. 
 
McCalman (2005) seeks to quantify the impact of TRIPS, by estimating an endogenous 
growth model for 27, mostly developed, countries61. He finds that in the short-run (i.e. when 
                                                          
61 See also McCalman (2001) who estimates the value of income transfers between countries in response to 
TRIPS. 
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the level of technology is held constant) the majority of countries lose due to a redistribution 
of wealth to foreign owners of technology. But in the long run, when research efforts can 
respond to the enhanced incentives provided by TRIPS, all countries benefit. McCalman 
shows that the increase in income levels due to enhanced innovation are sufficient to offset 
the redistributive impact of TRIPS, though under certain plausible parameter values India was 
found to lose. Given this last result, one might conjecture that countries with lower 
technological capability than India, but which were not covered in this study, may also suffer 
under TRIPS. 
 
In an interesting case study, McCalman (2002) examines the behaviour of Hollywood film 
studios with respect to IPR protection in different countries. Given the large fixed costs and 
relatively low duplication costs of new films, IPR protection is likely to be of great importance 
to film studios. McCalman studies the speed of diffusion of 60 Hollywood films to 37 
countries. The results suggest that increasing IPR protection from a relatively low level to a 
moderate level increases the speed of diffusion, but further increases to a high level reduce the 
speed of diffusion. The release of a film is likely to be delayed in countries with weak IPR 
protection because of the risk of piracy that will reduce returns on that film. In countries with 
relatively high IPR protection studios may be less worried about piracy, but more worried 
about competition with their existing products, and so may also delay the release of a film. 
Overall, the results suggest that while some IPR protection can speed the diffusion of new 
products (films in this case), very strong IPR protection may in fact reduce the speed of 
diffusion.  
 
Lippoldt and Park (2003) regress trade flows as well as FDI in- and outflows on GDP per 
capita, country risk, mean tariff rate and the Ginarte and Park index (1997). Their results 
regarding imports are rather ambiguous. While there is a significant positive impact of IPRs 
on imports for all countries, there is only a statistically modest positive effect for developing 
countries and an insignificant one in the case of least developed countries. These findings are 
in line with the arguments of Maskus and Penubarti (1995) suggesting that market size is 
important in determining the effect of patent protection.  
 
6. Economic Growth, Welfare and Intellectual Property Rights 
 
In the modern literature on economic growth, technological progress is viewed as the prime 
determinant of long-run growth. This technological progress arises from the activities of 
economic agents carried out in order to profit from the introduction of new products (Romer, 
1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Ch. 3) or the improvement of existing ones (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1991, Ch. 4; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Agents invest in R&D in the 
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expectation of profiting from the resulting inventions. But besides creating new products, 
innovative activity adds to society’s stock of knowledge, upon which subsequent innovations 
are based. This process is assisted where the information that IPRs protect is made available 
to other potential inventors as in patent claims.62 The global rate of growth then depends 
upon the rate of innovation and the stock of knowledge, and IPRs can increase growth by 
encouraging both.  
 
When it comes to exploring these issues in a multi-jurisdiction context, the most relevant 
analyses are those that examine a world composed of two types of countries: a developed, 
innovating “North” and a developing, imitating “South”. The main concerns have been 
whether increased IPR protection in the South would increase (i) the rate of (global) growth, 
(ii) the rate of technology transfer from the North to the South, and, (iii) welfare levels in both 
locations. A straightforward partial equilibrium analysis reveals that while the North always 
benefits from stronger IPR protection in the South, the South itself is found to benefit only 
when R&D is highly productive, such that the R&D induced by stronger IPR protection in 
the South results in significant cost reductions, and when the South comprises a large share of 
the overall market for the good (Chin and Grossman 1990). In these circumstances the 
additional monopoly profits available in the South provide a significant additional incentive 
for northern investment in R&D, and the welfare of the South increases due to the increased 
benefits in consumption resulting from northern R&D. But as Deardoff (1992) shows, the 
benefits of increased innovation through stronger IPR protection become weaker as more and 
more countries strengthen their IPR regimes, since the extra market covered and the extra 
innovation that can be stimulated by such protection diminishes. Since IPR holders engage in 
monopoly pricing that distorts consumer choice, strengthening IPR protection can lead to 
welfare reductions, particularly in a country that undertakes little or no R&D and would 
otherwise be able to free ride on foreign innovations63. Countering this is the notion that the 
North and the South may have different requirements and priorities when it comes to 
technology (Diwan and Rodrik, 1991). The South may then have an incentive to provide IPR 
protection in order to facilitate the invention of the particular technologies that meet its needs, 
which might otherwise be neglected. 
 
More recent work has considered dynamic general equilibrium models of innovation and 
growth. Several aspects are then shown as potentially important. One is the competition for 
                                                          
62 Mansfield (1985) provides evidence suggesting that the learning process from patent claims is relatively rapid, 
taking 10-12 months in the US. These benefits should not be overstated however since patents do not necessarily 
disclose sufficient information for the invention to be manufactured and many developing countries lack the 
capacity to adopt and adapt new techniques. 
63 Results such as these have led many commentators to argue that the main impact of TRIPS will be to shift 
wealth from developing countries to firms in developed countries. Rodrik (1994) for example states that 
“irrespective of assumptions made with respect to market structure and dynamic response, the impact effect of 
enhanced IPR in LDCs will be a transfer of wealth from LDC consumers and firms to foreign mostly industrial-
country firms” (p. 449). 
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scarce resources between R&D (investments in innovation) and the production of the new 
and improved goods that arise from the innovation. The channels through which technology 
can be transferred from one country to another then become significant. In the simplest case, 
where only goods are traded, successful southern imitation results in the competitive 
advantage for the production of imitated products shifting to the South. Stronger IPR 
protection in the South then decreases southern imitation and increases northern innovation 
in the short-run, as innovation becomes more profitable. But, as Helpman (1993) notes, in the 
long-run innovation in the North may fall, because if new products are produced for a longer 
time span in the North fewer resources are available for innovation there. Stronger IPR 
protection in the South may then reduce global growth. But weak IPR protection in the South 
may have effects besides reducing the incentive for innovation in the North. Northern 
exporters may be able to ‘mask’ their production technologies, thereby limiting the extent to 
which it can be imitated through traded goods (Taylor 1993). The potential gains from 
technology transfer through weak IPR protection in the South might then be offset by 
increases in northern masking.  
 
Where FDI is an option, the resource competition effect noted by Helpman is moderated (Lai 
1998). The innovator can now shift production of new goods to the South, reducing the 
competition for resources in the North. Stronger IPR protection in the South may increase 
the speed of foreign investment and the return to innovation further. This analysis becomes 
more complicated, however, if one assumes, as seems reasonable, that southern firms can 
more easily imitate the products of TNCs when they are produced in the South than products 
produced in the North. Stronger IPR protection in the South then makes “imitation” more 
costly, and southern firms find themselves devoting greater resources to imitation, but with a 
lower rate of success. The additional resources drawn into imitation in the South leave less 
available for production, causing FDI to contract. In response production is shifted back 
towards the North leaving fewer resources in the North available for innovation, which lowers 
the rate of innovation overall (Glass and Saggi, 2002).  
 
Extending the options further, the impact of stronger IPR protection in the South on 
incentives for firms in the North to innovate and to license advanced technologies to firms in 
the South has also been examined (Yang and Maskus 2001a). Licensing has the advantage of 
higher profits due to lower production costs in the South, but involves other costs in terms of 
contract negotiations, transferring the necessary technology and in the rents that the innovator 
must give to the licensee to discourage imitation. By reducing the risk of imitation, stronger 
IPR protection in the South reduces the costs of licensing (and its policing), thus encouraging 
licensing to the South and freeing up resources for innovation in the North.  
 
Perhaps the most important conclusion that follows from this brief review of the relevant 
theoretical literature is that the implications of stronger intellectual property protection in the 
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South on either the incentives for innovation in the North or the rate of technology transfer 
from the North to the South are not clear cut. Much depends on the channels of transmission 
available and the ability of the South to take advantage of the technology to which it is 
exposed. For individual countries the impact of IPR protection on growth is likely to depend 
upon country characteristics, most notably factor endowments. This leads to a further 
consideration. Many models of endogenous growth have one dynamic sector that exhibits 
learning by doing externalities or spillover effects and another traditional sector that does not. 
Then, depending on whether opening up to trade shifts resources toward or away from the 
dynamic sector, a country’s rate of economic growth may increase or decrease with 
globalisation. The reallocation of resources will depend upon a country’s initial factor 
endowments, amongst other things. While IPR protection would be expected to enhance 
growth in countries that move toward free trade and have a comparative advantage in the 
dynamic sector, its impact on countries with a disadvantage in this sector is less clear. 
 
There is a small empirical literature that directly tests whether stronger IPRs are likely to result 
in higher growth. The results from this literature are summarised in Table 3. This literature is 
not generally concerned with testing for the specific channels through which technology is 
being transferred among countries, or for the mechanisms through which growth might be 
enhanced, but simply whether, where and when a positive effect is discernable. The approach 
adopted is to include a measure of the strength of IPR protection in a standard cross-country 
empirical growth framework.  
 
While issues remain over the direction of causality64 the results of the various studies lead to 
fairly consistent conclusions. Gould and Gruben (1996) employ the RRI to examine the 
importance of stronger IPR protection for growth in a sample of up to 95 countries with data 
averaged over the period 1960-1988. They also examine whether the impact of IPR protection 
on growth depends upon the degree of openness to trade, the underlying argument being that 
in closed economies stronger IPR protection may not have the desired effect of encouraging 
innovation and higher growth, as firms may not have the incentive to innovate if their market 
is guaranteed65. The model of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) provides a theoretical rationale 
for this hypothesis, with firms in closed economies finding it more profitable to copy foreign 
technology than develop new technology.  
 
Gould and Gruben regress the average growth of real GDP per capita on the RRI and a 
number of standard explanatory variables, including initial GDP per capita, the investment to 
                                                          
64 The level of IPR protection is highly correlated with a country’s level of economic development. Ginarte and 
Park (1997) examine the determinants of their index and find that higher levels of GDP per capita, shares of 
R&D in GDP, openness and levels of human capital are positively related to the strength of IPR protection. 
65 Their hypothesis is based on firm-level evidence from Brazil by Braga and Willmore (1991) who found a 
negative relationship between the degree of trade protection and a firm’s propensity to develop new technology 
or purchase it abroad.  
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GDP ratio, the secondary school enrolment ratio and initial levels of literacy. They find that 
stronger IPR protection has a positive impact on growth, which is marginally statistically 
significant. Gould and Gruben then go on to examine the relationship between IPR 
protection and growth in open versus closed economies. Openness is measured using three 
variables. The first two are the Black Market Premium (BMP) and distortions in real exchange 
rates. Countries with high BMPs and high real exchange rate distortions tend to be highly 
distorted and inward oriented (De Long and Summers (1991) and Dollar (1992) respectively). 
The third measure is a composite index of a country’s trade regime developed by Gould and 
Ruffin (1993) comprising a number of existing trade orientation indices as well as a country’s 
BMP, real exchange rate distortions and the ratio of import taxes to imports. Each of these 
are interacted with the RRI and included in the growth regression. From their results, Gould 
and Gruben conclude that IPR protection has a slightly larger effect on growth in more open 
economies. These last conclusions are tentative, however, since, as Gould and Gruben 
acknowledge, openness is multifaceted, which makes using a single measure problematic, 
particularly since the measures of openness that have been employed in the empirical literature 
tend not to be highly correlated (Pritchett, 1996)66.  
 
Thompson and Rushing (1996) conduct a similar exercise, regressing the average growth of 
real GDP per capita between 1970 and 1985 on the ratio of investment to GDP, the 
secondary school enrolment ratio, population growth, initial GDP per capita and the RRI for 
112 countries. While they find a positive relationship between the RRI and growth, it is not 
statistically significant. They then go on to consider whether IPR protection may have an 
impact upon a country’s growth rate, but only once a country has reached a certain (but 
unknown) level of development, as measured by initial GDP per capita. For this they employ 
threshold regression techniques finding a threshold at an initial level of GDP of $3400 (in 
1980 dollars). For countries below this value there is no significant relationship between IPR 
protection and growth, but above, the relationship is positive and significant. 
 
In a later paper (Thompson and Rushing, 1999), they extend their analysis to a system of three 
equations. The three dependent variables are: the growth rate of real GDP per capita, the ratio 
of total factor productivity (TFP) in 1971 to that in 1990 and the RRI. The system is estimated 
using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) techniques for 55 developed and developing 
countries. They once again split their sample in two depending on the initial level of GDP per 
capita. It is found that increases in TFP have a positive and significant impact on GDP 
growth. The IPR index is found to have an insignificant impact on TFP for the full sample of 
countries, but a positive and significant impact for the richest sub-sample. The results suggest 
that in the most developed countries stronger IPR protection impacts upon growth by 
enhancing TFP. 
                                                          
66  Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) provide a critique of the most popular measures of openness. 
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Falvey, Foster and Greenaway (2004a) extend and update the single equation analysis by 
employing recently developed threshold techniques of Hansen (1996, 1999 and 2000). These 
allow the positioning and significance of a threshold (i.e. a structural break) to be identified, as 
well as the possibility of having more than one threshold. They use the GPI and a panel of up 
to 80 countries with data averaged over four five-year periods between 1975 and 1994. They 
follow the approach of Thompson and Rushing, arguing that the impact of IPR protection is 
likely to depend upon the level of development of a country as well as the structure of its 
economy. They use initial GDP per capita and manufacturing value added (since 
manufacturing tends to be the most R&D intensive sector) as alternative indicators of 
imitative/innovative ability. The two measures of imitative ability yield consistent results, 
indicating a three-regime model. For countries in either the low or the high regimes a positive 
and significant impact of IPR protection is found. But for countries in the middle regime no 
significant relationship between IPRs and growth appears to exist.  
 
Schneider (2005) examines the effect of high technology trade, IP protection, and FDI on 
innovation and growth. She uses a panel data set from 1970 to 1990, which contains data on 
up to 19 developed and 28 developing countries.  Regarding innovation (measured by U.S. 
patent applications by respective foreign residents) she finds that IPRs (measured by the 
Ginarte and Park index) have a statistically significant positive impact on innovation in 
developed countries but a statistically significant negative impact in developing countries. 
Schneider suggests that this can be attributed to the fact that innovative activities in 
developing countries are often adaptive or imitative. Schneider points out that, instead of 
turning away from intellectual property protection in developing countries, innovative 
activities should be fostered, if necessary with support from developed countries. In the 
growth regression IPRs are significant and positive for the sample of all countries but 
insignificant in the split samples. Thus, it is difficult to draw any conclusions from these 
findings. However, Schneider argues that the impact of IPRs on growth might not be fully 
captured in a traditional growth regression, due to its indirect nature. 
 
Finally, there has been at least one attempt to explore the way in which IPR protection can 
influence the factors that directly contribute to the growth of GDP per worker. Park (1999) 
uses SUR methods to estimate a system of four equations. The four dependent variables are 
output growth, the fraction of GDP invested in the capital stock, the fraction of GDP 
invested in human capital and the fraction of GDP invested in R&D. The latter three variables 
are included as explanatory variables in the output growth equation, while the GPI is included 
as an explanatory variable in all four equations. The model was estimated for 60 countries with 
data averaged over the period 1960-1990. The results suggest that, while IPR protection has 
an insignificant direct impact on output growth, it does have a significant indirect effect 
through its impact on physical capital and R&D investment. Splitting the sample in two based 
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on the average level of GDP per worker, Park finds that IPR protection affects growth 
indirectly through these inputs in the richest half of the sample only, with no significant 
impact found for the poorest half.  
 
7. TRIPS and Developing Countries 
 
As the narratives concerning the coming into force of TRIPS vary, so does the way TRIPS is 
perceived. While some observers, especially from the developing world, condemn TRIPS as a 
neo-imperialistic document67 others emphasise the possible gains from TRIPS, for example 
via an increase in technology inflows through formal channels as FDI and licensing. 
Accordingly, the first group recommends a minimalistic implementation of the agreement and 
call for a more ‘development friendly’ interpretation of TRIPS. This point of view has been 
sharply criticised by the proponents of the ‘self-interest theorists’. Lately a more sophisticated 
point of view has gained ground, which on the one hand acknowledges that simply 
implementing TRIPS into a developing countries legal framework will not yield huge 
developmental benefits and can even cause welfare losses in some cases, and on the other 
hand recognises that TRIPS can have beneficial effects for those countries if implemented 
with care (Gervais, 2007: pp. 13-17).   
 
Keeping this in mind different aspects of the TRIPS Agreement and their implications for 
developing countries will be addressed in the following section. As already mentioned, TRIPS 
represents a significant change in the global intellectual property regime. The TRIPS 
Agreement for the first time combined the mosaic of intellectual property conventions, which 
until then constituted the international intellectual property regime, into one agreement68. 
Another major change from the Paris Convention to TRIPS regards the subjects of 
patentability. While the first provided the opportunity to omit certain matters the TRIPS 
Agreement requires that “patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, 
in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
capable of industrial application” (Art. 27.1, emphasis added). The only exceptions are 
diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods (Art. 27.3 (a)), and plants and animals. However 
all members are obliged to provide patent protection for microorganisms and patent or sui 
generis protection for plant varieties (Art. 27.3 (b)). Further “[m]embers may exclude from 
patentability inventions, the prevention [...] of which is necessary to protect ordre public or 
morality [...]” (Art. 27.2). In particular the obligatory protection of plant varieties as well as the 
                                                          
67 “The intent of the TRIPS Agreement is perfectly clear. From the start of the industrial revolution, every 
country that became economically great began by copying: the Germans copied the British, the Americans copied 
the British and the Germans, and the Japanese copied everybody. The thrust of the TRIPS Agreement is to 
ensure that this process of growth by copying and learning by doing will never happen again” (Kingston 2005: p. 
658) 
68 The Agreement covers Copyright and Related Rights, Trademarks, Geographical Indications, Industrial 
Designs, Patents, Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits, Protection of Undisclosed Information, 
and Control of Anti-Competitive Practices in Contractual Licences (WTO 1994, TRIPS Part II) 
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impossibility to exclude some matters from patentability constituted a major change for many 
developing countries. As Correa (2000: p. 50, p. 68) points out only a few developing 
countries provided for plant variety protection before TRIPS and 65 countries, the vast 
majority of them developing countries, excluded pharmaceutical products from patentability 
in 1980. Still, while the room for manoeuvre has been limited by TRIPS, it has not vanished. 
There is no clear definition of the requirements for patentability, namely the inventive-step, 
the capability of industrial application and for newness69. There have been and probably will 
continue to exist substantial differences among countries regarding the interpretation of these 
terms - even among developed countries (Correa 2000: pp. 57-61). Thus, in this aspect TRIPS 
does provide for some scope of action for signatory countries. For example countries are free 
to establish utility model patents with a low inventive step, which in the past successfully 
increased local adaptive innovation in Germany, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.  
 
Besides the subjects of patentability there are a couple of other provisions that require relevant 
legal changes for many countries. While the provision of ‘national treatment’ is not new - the 
Paris Convention was based on that principle - the principle of ‘Most Favoured Nation’ 
(MFN)70  is new to the intellectual property framework (UNCTAD-ICTSD 2003: p. 48). The 
length of patent protection must last for 20 years from the date of completion (Art. 33), in 
process infringement cases the burden of proof is reversed (Art. 34), a provision that 
considerably strengthens the position of the patentee, working requirements are not allowed71 
(Art. 27.1), and finally compulsory licensing, while not entirely banned, is subject to severe 
restrictions (Art. 31). Compulsory licensing has been pointed out as a viable policy tool to 
address development issues (e.g. to foster technology transfer). However, it should be kept in 
perspective that a country’s ability to effectively use a patented technology depends to a great 
degree on its technological capacity. Hence more advanced countries may benefit from 
compulsory licensing, while least-developed countries may lack the ability to do so (Juma 
1999: pp. 14). Further, the possibility to request the revision of compulsory licensing when the 
circumstances that led to the granting no longer exist intensifies the insecurity for the licensee 
and may discourage a company from seeking compulsory licensing in the first place since it 
may not be able to recover its investment (Correa 2005: pp. 248). These aspects, among 
others, vitally constrain the developmental possibilities of compulsory licensing in general. 
 
In order to account for the concerns raised by many developing countries that their access to 
technology would be locked up by TRIPS, several passages of the Agreement refer to the 
                                                          
69 “[...] patents shall be available for any inventions [...] provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and 
are capable of industrial application” (Art.27.1) 
70 Any “advantage, favour, privilege or immunity” accorded by one Member to another must “immediately and 
unconditionally” be granted to all other members (Art. 4). 
71 Art 27.1 states that “patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination [...]whether 
products are imported or locally produced”. This has been interpreted as ban on any requirements to produce an 
invention locally (Correa 2000: p. 90). 
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unique situation of developing countries. Already the preamble to the agreement recognises 
“the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual 
property, including developmental and technological objectives” and “the special needs of the least-
developed country members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic 
implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to create a sound and viable 
technological base” (TRIPS preamble, emphasis added). The relevance of the dissemination and 
transfer of technology is further strengthened in Article 7, where the objectives are outlined;  
in Article 8, which refers to the principles of the agreement72; and in Article 66.2 , which calls 
upon developed countries to “provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their 
territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-
developed country members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable 
technological base” (Art. 66.2). However, there has been disagreement upon the question of 
whether this article actually obligates developed countries to do so and which countries are in 
fact referred to with the term “developed country members” (Moon 2008: p. 2). Moon (2008) 
and Correa (2007) recently investigated to what extent this ‘obligation’73 has been met by 
developed countries. Both studies focus on the mandatory annual reports on Article 66.2 
activities by developed countries and come to the conclusion that in general developed 
countries have not met their obligations, since they either failed to submit their reports at all 
or their reported activities did not focus on LDCs, did not qualify as technology transfer, or 
their activities should be rather classified as traditional Official Development Aid (ODA).   
 
TRIPS provided for a range of transitional periods for countries to bring their national IPR 
laws into TRIPS compliance. Except for least-developed countries who still have time until 
2016 to introduce “patent protection for pharmaceutical products”, all other transition periods 
have by now  expired (UNCTAD ICTSD 2003: pp. 48-49). 
 
All controversies among members are subject to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism. On the 
one hand this, as already mentioned, has the advantage, especially for developed countries, 
that contrary to the WIPO Convention, there is an enforcement mechanism to apply in the 
case of non-compliance to the Agreement. On the other hand, it also has advantages for 
developing countries since unilateral actions by any member are unlawful. This in fact can 
prevent developing countries from ‘section 301’ procedures under the US Trade Act. 
However, there has been evidence that the unilateral actions by the US did not cease with the 
introduction of TRIPS (Drahos 2006: pp. 89-99).  
 
                                                          
72 Article 8.2 allows for measures “to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the 
resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology”. 
However these measures have to be consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement (TRIPS, Article 8.2). 
73 Due to concerns from developing countries, that developed countries do not comply with article 66.2 the 
WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha reaffirmed that “[...] the provisions of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS 
Agreement are mandatory [...]” (WTO 2001). 
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TRIPS substantially alters the global intellectual property regime and the minimum standards 
it introduces constitute a considerable strengthening of IPR protection in most developing 
countries. There is no question that developed countries are the ones to gain most from 
TRIPS and that imitation and reverse engineering are increasingly restricted under TRIPS. 
However, TRIPS in no ways harmonises the national intellectual property laws. As pointed 
out there is still room left for manoeuvres in order to generate intellectual property laws that 
suit a country’s level of economic development. And there are potential gains especially from 
dynamic effects for developing countries. On the other hand, whether these gains can be 
realised remains to be seen. The costs of implementing, administering and enforcing TRIPS 
have to be borne beforehand (UNCTAD-ICTSD 2003: p. 49). Despite the attempt to bring all 
relevant intellectual property issues into one agreement, there are still subjects regulated 
outside of this framework by other agreements. The most important probably is the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).74 Its 
membership75 has substantially benefited from TRIPS, since Art. 27.3 (b) commits TRIPS 
members to either protect plant varieties by patents or sui generis systems, where UPOV is the 
only agreement that provides sui generis protection for plant varieties at the moment76. Besides 
the very few choices countries have if they decide to protect plant varieties by sui generis 
systems, some developing countries joined UPOV because it was a concession made in 
bilateral free trade agreements with the US or the European Union (UNCTAD-ICTSD 
2003:53). These bilateral agreements on trade and investment increasingly incorporate 
intellectual property issues.  
 
As already emphasized TRIPS generates a minimum level for intellectual property protection 
and nothing impedes countries from implementing higher standards of intellectual property 
protection as long as they are not contrary to any provisions of TRIPS. Thus, TRIPS-Plus 
standards are possible.  A TRIPS-PLUS standard bilateral agreement “requires a Member to 
implement a more extensive standard [than TRIPS]; or which eliminates an option for a 
member under a TRIPS standard” (Drahos 2006: p. 91). Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
often do not include explicit references to intellectual property; many however do protect the 
rights of investors, whereas intellectual property is included in the definition of investment. In 
other cases the BIT is used to bribe countries into signing bilateral intellectual property 
agreements (BIPs). Both do not generate a TRIPS-Plus standard per se, though there are 
provisions in the ‘standard agreements’77 that do further strengthen IPRs. An example of this 
                                                          
74 The Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources, and the Convention on Biological Diversity should also be mentioned 
in this respect. The first one is in some respects controversial  (UNCTAD-ICTSD 2003:52, 54).  
75 40 of the currently 67 Members (Status on May 2009) of UPOV have joined the Agreement after 1994 (UPOV 
2009). 
76 There have been attempts to develop alternative systems, e.g. by the Organization of African Unity, South 
Korea, and India (UNCTAD-ICTSD 2003: 53, footnote 40 and 41 at p. 60). 
77 Since bilateral negotiations are cost and time consuming, the U.S. negotiators stick to a prototype agreement 
that has been approved by congress. If they do not deviate too far from this standardisation the approval of these 
treaties by congress is very likely (Drahos 2006:92).  
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proceeding is the bilateral investment treatment between the United States and Nicaragua 
(1995), which among other things committed Nicaragua to join the UPOV or the Agreement 
on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA) between the United States and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which also obligated Jordan to ratify UPOV and narrowed the 
exceptions from patentability. Another example is the FTA between the European Union and 
Mexico, which included TRIPS-PLUS standards (Drahos 2006: pp. 92-101).  
 
The combination of multilateralism and bilateralism has a noteworthy consequence. Since 
Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement obligates a country to make any concessions granted to one 
Member available to all the other Members too, the signatories (of a BIT, BIP or FTA) have 
to provide higher standards of IPR protection to all WTO members. Therefore these 
agreements introduce TRIPS-PLUS standards country by country into the WTO (Drahos 
2006:100).  
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
 
The main purpose of IPRs is to encourage innovation by granting innovators a temporary 
monopoly over their innovations, thus allowing them to earn a positive return on the 
potentially large investments in R&D undertaken. While benefitting the individual innovators, 
by encouraging innovation IPRs are also expected to add to the overall stock of knowledge, 
which according to recent theories of growth will make future innovation easier and lead to 
sustained economic growth. While few would consider IPR protection to be a panacea for 
countries, and developing countries in particular, views on the importance of IPR protection 
tend to be polarised. On one side, it is believed that stronger IPR protection can encourage 
innovation, technology diffusion and enhance growth. On the other it is thought that stronger 
IPR protection leads to monopoly power for patent holders, reduces the incentive to innovate 
and limits the diffusion of knowledge. The evidence reviewed here supports neither claim.  
 
In the past, countries have been able to adapt their IPR regimes to facilitate technological 
transfer and to promote their own industrial policy objectives. Evidence exists to suggest that 
many current innovators operated lax IPR systems in the past designed to encourage 
technology diffusion through imitation. Until recently, IPR policy was largely set at the 
national level which allowed countries to do this. The TRIPS Agreement however has shifted 
the conflict and the social bargain from the national level to a supranational domain. 
Consequently it was international power relations which played an important role in setting 
the level of IPRs for the vast majority of countries (May, 2007). It can be argued that 
industrialised innovators benefitted most from this change. Since the vast majority of 
intellectual property is produced and held in industrialised countries, developing countries are 
dependent on spillovers or formal technology transfer from these centres of R&D activity. 
TRIPS however, by increasing the strength of IPRs reduces the possibility to free-ride on 
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technological knowledge produced in the North for most developing countries and limits the 
South to formal channels of technology transfer, which might be associated with substantial 
costs.78 This, along with potential price increases and/or reduced product availability in the 
South and substantial implementation and enforcement costs associated with TRIPS have 
raised objections from the developing world.  
 
Despite the above costs of IPRs for technology borrowers, stronger IPRs can increase FDI, 
trade and licensing flows, which are potential vehicles of technology transfer and hence can 
foster growth. There seems to be some evidence for an overall positive impact of IPR 
protection on bilateral exchange. While the findings for trade and foremost licensing are fairly 
consistent, the case of FDI seems to be the most ambiguous. The impact of IPR protection 
on growth, innovation and technology diffusion in non-innovating countries is likely to 
depend upon a number of factors. While stronger IPR protection in the poorest countries is 
not likely to lead to substantial benefits in terms of innovation or technology diffusion, the 
administrative cost of developing a patent system and the enforcement of TRIPS, along with 
the potential abuses of market power in small closed markets suggests that such countries 
could lose out from TRIPS. Stronger IPR protection in the poorest countries may also inhibit 
or lengthen the imitative stage of development that seems to be necessary in order to develop 
innovative capacity in many industries. In other developing countries however the potential 
for benefits from TRIPS is stronger. Existing firms engaging in imitation for example could 
be encouraged through stronger IPR protection to shift resources towards adaptive 
innovation, while stronger IPR protection is likely to increase trade and FDI flows into 
countries with existing imitative ability, thus enhancing technology transfer. Countries such as 
China, which have seen relatively large increases in innovative activity in recent years, are also 
likely to benefit increasingly from stronger IPR protection by encouraging domestic 
innovation, as well as through increased technology diffusion through formal channels and 
potentially through the offshoring of R&D activities from advanced countries. 
 
Looking forward, while there is little enthusiasm in the developing world to see ever stronger 
IPR regimes firms in the developed world are keen to see stronger IPRs enforced 
internationally and to see an ever wider variety of innovations patentable (particularly in the 
area of bio-technology). Developing countries are however keen to get access to rich country 
markets and are likely to be willing to accept higher IPR levels as the price of such access. 
Combined with the Most Favoured Nation clause of the WTO this process of regional 
integration and bilateral agreements is therefore likely to result in a further increase in IPR 
levels for many countries in the near future. The impact of these changes on technology 
diffusion is unclear. On the one hand, we would expect formal channels of diffusion to 
expand, both because of the higher IPR levels and because of the increased integration 
                                                          
78 This does not imply the informal technology transfer comes free of charge. Imitation of advanced technology 
can be cost and time intensive as well.  
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achieved through these bilateral and regional agreements. On the other, we would expect 
informal channels that have been used as a means of developing an innovative sector in the 
past to diminish in importance. Countries will still have some means at their disposal to 
influence the extent of diffusion through patent application and renewal fees, as well as 
through their definition of the “inventive step” required to make an innovation patentable and 
the breadth of the allowable patent claims. Other policies, such as those towards education, 
R&D investment and policies to attract FDI are also likely to play a role for a number of 
countries as a means of developing a technological base. 
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Box 1: Substantive Requirements of TRIPS in the WTO 
General obligations Comments 
1. National treatment Applied for persons 
2. Most favoured nation Reciprocity exemptions for copyright; prior regionals 
/ bilaterals allowed 
3. Transparency  
  
Copyright and related rights  
4. Observes Berne Convention Does not require moral rights 
5. Minimum 50-year term Clarifies corporate copyrights 
6. Programmes protected as literary works A significant change in global norms 
7. Data compilations protected similarly  
8. Neighbouring rights protection for phonogram 
producers, performers 
 
9. Rental rights A significant change in global norms 
  
Trademarks and related marks  
10. Confirms and clarifies Paris Convention  
11. Strengthens protection of well-known marks Deters use of confusing marks and speculative 
registration 
12. Clarifies non-use Deters use of collateral restrictions to invalidate marks 
13. Prohibits compulsory licensing  
14. Geographical indications Additional protection for wines and spirits 
  
Patents  
15. Subject matter coverage Patents provided for products and processes in all 
fields of technology 
16. Biotechnology Must be covered but exceptions allowed for plants 
and animals developed by traditional methods 
17. Plant breeder’s rights Patents or effective sui generis system required 
18. Exclusive rights of importation  
19. Severe restrictions on compulsory licensing Domestic protection can no longer be required; 
nonexclusive licenses with adequate compensation 
20. Minimum 20-year patent length from filing date  
21. Reversal of burden of proof in process patents  
22. Industrial designs Minimum term of protection: 10 years 
  
Integrated circuits designs  
23. Protection extended to articles incorporating 
infringed design 
A significant change in global norms 
24. Minimum 10 years protection  
  
Undisclosed information  
25. Trade secrets protected against unfair methods of 
disclosure 
New in many developing countries 
  
Abuse of IPRs  
26. Wide latitude for competition policy to control 
competitive abuses 
Cannot contradict remainder of WTO agreement 
  
Enforcement measures  
27. Requires civil, criminal measures and border 
enforcement 
Will be costly for developing countries 
  
Transitional arrangements  
28. Transition periods 5 years for developing and transition economies; 11 
 70
years for poorest countries 
29. Pipeline protection for pharmaceuticals Not required but a provision for maintaining novelty 
and exclusive marketing rights 
  
Institutional arrangements  
30. TRIPS Council Agreement to be monitored and reviewed 
31. Dispute settlement Standard approach with 5-year moratorium in some 
cases 
Source: Maskus (2000a) 
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Table 1: Instruments and Agreements for Protecting IPRs 
Type of Intellectual Property Instruments of Protection Protected Subject Matter Primary Fields of Application International Agreements 
Industrial Property Patents and utility models New, non-obvious inventions with 
industrial utility 
Manufacturing, agriculture Paris Convention 
Patent Cooperation Treaty 
Budapest Treaty 
Strasbourg Agreement 
TRIPS 
 Industrial designs Ornamental designs of products Manufacturing, clothing, 
automobiles, electronics, etc. 
Hague Agreement 
Locarno Agreement 
TRIPS 
 Trademarks Identifying signs and symbols All industries Madrid Agreement 
Nice Agreement 
Vienna Agreement 
 Geographical indications Identifying place names Wines, spirits Lisbon Agreement 
TRIPS 
Artistic and literary property Copyrights and neighbouring 
rights 
Original expressions of authorship Publishing, electronic 
entertainment, software, 
broadcasting 
Berne Convention 
Rome Convention 
Geneva Convention 
Brussels Convention 
WIPR Copyright Treaty 
WIPO Performance and Phonograms 
Treaty 
Universal Copyright Convention 
TRIPS 
Sui generis protection Integrated circuits Original designs Computer chip industry Washington Treaty  
TRIPS 
 Database protection Databases Information processing EC Directive 96/9/EC 
 Plant breeder’s rights New, stable, distinct varieties Agriculture, food UPOV 
TRIPS 
Trade secrets Laws against unfair competition Business information held in secret All industries TRIPS 
Source: Primo Braga, Fink and Sepulveda (2000) 
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Box 2: Aspects of TRIPS and Their Impact on Innovation and Technology Diffusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Included in the TRIPS Agreement are the following aspects of intellectual property protection: 
• Patents – give their owners the right to exclude all others from making, selling, importing, or using 
the product or process named in the patent without authorisation for a fixed period of time. Three 
forms of patents may be applied for; (i) Invention patents require significant non-obviousness and as 
such a discrete advance in technology; (ii) Utility models tend to be awarded for incremental 
improvements of existing products and technologies; (iii) Industrial designs protect the aesthetic or 
ornamental aspects of a commercial article. 
• Copyrights – protect the rights of creators of literary and artistic works to communicate, display, or 
perform those works in some medium, plus the rights to make and sell copies. 
• Trademarks and service marks – protect rights to use a particular distinctive mark or name to 
identify a product, service or company. 
• Geographical indications – are related to trademarks and certify that a consumer product was made 
in a particular place and that it embodies physical characteristics of that location. 
• Trade Secrets – are proprietary information about production processes, including items such as 
customer lists and organisational methods. Standard liability laws guard against unauthorised 
disclosure through commercially unfair means. 
• Layout Designs of Integrated Circuits – covers the layout design of integrated circuits, the chips on 
which they are masked, and products that incorporate the chip. TRIPS specifically permits reverse 
engineering of integrated circuits. 
 
The importance of these different aspects of IPR protection for innovation and technology diffusion are 
likely to vary. Here we discuss some of these differences. 
 
Patents are expected to increase both innovation and technology diffusion. By providing an incentive to 
undertake R&D and the associated costs of inventing a new technology or product, patents should encourage 
innovation. The empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between patent rights and innovation is not 
strong however (see Section 3). Through the publication of claims, patents add to the stock of public 
knowledge and can encourage technology diffusion. The evidence in favour of such diffusion is stronger (see 
Section 4). 
 
Literary and artistic ideas protected by copyrights are without industrial applicability. While not encouraging 
industrial innovation, copyright protection is aimed at encouraging creative works that provide social, cultural 
and economic benefits to society. On the other hand, copyright protection limits the dissemination of literary 
works and raises the static costs of education, research and education. 
 
Trademarks and geographical indications do not protect the creation of additional knowledge nor in theory 
do they restrict imitation or copying of protected goods as long as they are sold under a different mark. Like 
copyrights therefore they are unlikely to directly raise innovation or encourage technology transfer. Similar 
arguments can be made for the protection of integrated circuit designs, though TRIPS specifically allows for 
the reverse engineering of such designs. Trademarks are however likely to lower search costs, protect 
consumers from fraud regarding the origin of a product and safeguard commercial reputations for quality. 
Since trademarks and geographical indications are used as a signal of quality, they may also encourage firms to 
maintain or improve quality over time, as well as generating further product differentiation. There is also 
some anecdotal evidence that under the right circumstances trademarks can contribute to business 
development among low- and middle-income producers in the developing world (see for example Maskus et 
al., 2000c; Maskus, 2005). 
 
continued… 
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Trade secrets are rationalised as a mechanism to foster innovations that do not comply with the strict 
requirements for the patentability of products and processes. Firms may choose not to patent an innovation 
for a number of reasons; (i) the innovator may judge their creation to be unpatentable in legal terms, but hard 
to imitate; (ii) a firm may prefer not to disclose its processes, as required by patents, because disclosure could 
reduce expected profits; (iii) firms may wish to avoid the costs of patenting. Trade secrets do not incur costs 
in the form of application and grant procedures, yet they also do not add to the base of knowledge available 
to the public. As such trade secrets would not be expected to raise the diffusion of technology significantly, 
though the potential exists for trade secrets to be reverse-engineered. Trade secrets may however encourage 
innovation, especially of the small, incremental type. 
 
Source: Based on Maskus (2000a, pp.20-23 and 36-50). 
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Table 2: Summary of Effects of Stronger Intellectual Property Rights on Innovation, Technology 
Diffusion and Growth 
 Domestic Intellectual Property Rights Technology Spillovers 
Domestic 
Innovation 
  
Domestic R&D Stronger IPRs increase domestic R&D spending Evidence that higher R&D spending 
facilitates technology transfer and raises 
growth 
Domestic 
Patenting 
Evidence mixed in general. But threshold analysis 
shows stronger IPRs (1) increase domestic 
patenting in countries with innovative/imitative 
capacity; (2) reduce domestic patenting in more 
open economies 
Evidence relating domestic patenting to 
growth is mixed. In developing countries 
there is little evidence of a positive impact 
of domestic patenting on growth 
Channels of 
International 
Technology 
Diffusion 
  
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
Evidence mixed in general, but strong IPRs seem 
to be important for some TNC activities 
(production and R&D) and in industries where 
products can be imitated (chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals). Some evidence that TNCs more 
willing to transfer technology to countries with 
stronger IPRs 
Evidence generally mixed on whether 
inward FDI provides technology 
spillovers, although some evidence of 
spillovers to host country firms with 
absorptive capacity. Some evidence of 
spillovers from outward FDI 
Technology 
Licensing 
Limited evidence, but what evidence there is 
suggests stronger IPRs increase licensing, 
particularly in countries with innovative/imitative 
capacity 
Little evidence 
Foreign Patenting Positive effect stronger in more open economies 
and in countries with higher innovative/imitative 
capacity 
Evidence of positive (negative) spillovers 
from foreign patenting for developing 
countries with strong (weak) IPRs, high 
(low) innovative/imitative capacity and 
large, open (small, closed) markets 
Trade  Impact of IPRs on trade flows depends upon 
market size and the imitative ability of the 
importing country. Positive effect of IPRs on 
trade in manufacturing goods (except goods 
difficult to imitate) in countries that have 
imitative capacity. Possible negative effects in 
small markets with weak imitative ability 
Trade has been found to promote 
technology spillovers both between 
developed countries and from developed 
to developing countries 
Domestic 
Growth 
Evidence that stronger IPRs increase growth in 
developed countries and developing countries 
with low innovative/imitative capacity. No effect 
evident for developing countries with high 
innovative/imitative capacity 
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Table 3: Summary of Research on IPRs and Growth 
Study Sample and 
Method 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
IPR Index Results 
Gould and Gruben 
(1996) 
95 countries; 
cross-section with 
data averaged over 
the period 
1960-1988 
Growth of real 
GDP per capita 
Rapp and Rozek 
Index 
IPR protection has a positive 
impact on growth, which is 
slightly stronger in more open 
economies 
Thompson and 
Rushing (1996) 
112 countries; 
cross-section with 
data averaged over 
the period 
1970-1985 
Growth of real 
GDP per capita 
Rapp and Rozek 
Index 
IPR protection has a positive 
impact on growth only in 
countries that have reached a 
certain initial level of GDP 
per capita 
Thompson and 
Rushing (1999) 
55 countries; 
Seemingly 
Unrelated 
Regression 
techniques on a 
cross-section of 
data over the 
period 1971-1990 
Growth of real 
GDP per capita; 
Ratio of Total 
Factor Productivity 
(TFP)79 in 1971 to 
that in 1990; the 
Rapp and Rozek 
Index of IPRs 
Rapp and Rozek 
Index 
IPR protection has a positive 
impact on TFP in relatively 
rich countries, which in turn 
impacts positively upon 
output growth 
Park (1999) 60 countries; 
Seemingly 
Unrelated 
Regression 
techniques on a 
cross-section of 
data over the 
period 1960-1990 
Growth of real 
GDP, Fraction of 
GDP invested in 
physical capital, 
fraction of GDP 
invested in human 
capital, fraction of 
GDP invested in 
R&D 
Ginarte and Park 
Index 
IPR protection has no direct 
impact on growth. IPR 
protection has an indirect 
positive impact on growth 
through physical capital 
investment and R&D in the 
most advanced countries 
Falvey, Foster and 
Greenaway (2004) 
80 countries; five-
year averages over 
the period 1975-
1994. 
Growth of real 
GDP per capita 
Ginarte and Park 
Index 
Positive impact of IPR 
protection on growth in 
countries with low and high 
GDP per capita. No impact 
of IPR protection in middle-
income countries 
 
 
                                                           
79 Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is a derived measure of technology change. 
